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The Dynamics of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution:
Two Florida Case Studies
Robert J. Levy*
Criminal justice scholars agree that the process cannot adequately be captured
simply by reporting guilty pleas, jury acquittals and convictions. Rather, one must
imagine a giant cornucopia, the large end representing the huge mass of unreported
and uncleared crimes, the small end representing the small number of convicted
felons sentenced to prison. Between these terminal points can be found all those
criminals the police decide not to arrest or refer for prosecution, all those cases
prosecutors decide not to prosecute, the cases prosecutors decide to dismiss (or
"nolle prosequi," often referred to as "nol pros") after they have been filed, prose-
cutions judges dismiss for lack of probable cause or because the prosecutor vio-
lated some legislatively or constitutionally required practice, and the negotiated
guilty pleas prosecutors and defense counsel arrange (usually with accompanying
sentences). 1
Nor is it sufficient simply to catalogue the numbers in the categories of crimi-
nal justice outcomes between unreported crimes and prison sentences. Understand-
ing the criminal process requires knowledge of the policy and strategic decisions
prosecutors make when deciding whether to file charges,2 the stresses defense
counsel undergo in dealing with clients charged with serious crimes, the pressures
involved for prosecutors deciding whether to plea bargain and what sentence to
offer for a plea, and the difficulties defense counsel face (with some likelihood of
later client recriminations) deciding whether to recommend that a specific offer
should be accepted. Above all, one must appreciate the enormous tension trials
impose on both prosecutors and defense counsel as, minute by minute, they make
crucial tactical decisions which might influence or even determine the jury's ver-
dict. Even after a plea or a jury verdict of guilt, difficult tactical and penal policy
issues remain-for prosecutors, defense counsel and.judges: what sentence is
proper for the offense? should the defendant appeal? what evidentiary or tactical
mistakes by the prosecutor or the trial judge compel or justify another trial for a
convicted defendant? This aspect of criminal justice, what might be called the
"trial practice" process, for obvious reasons has seldom been studied systemati-
cally. Yet, in-depth examination of individual cases, while lacking empirical gen-
eralizability, can provide insights into the issues, especially into the tactical choices
prosecutors and defense counsel must make quickly and under fire, and the some-
times painful choices defendants must make (whether to plead guilty, whether a
* William L. Prosser Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Minnesota.
The literature describing the scope of the process and examining each of these possible out-
comes is vast. See generally RICHARD S. FRASE and ROBERT A. WEIDNER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-
TEM, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 371-93 (2d ed. 2001).
2 See, e.g., Robert J. Levy, Discretionary Prosecution of Child Sexual Abusers: Adolescent
Victims, 17 BAR ILAN LAW STUDIES 7 (2002).
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sentence offer by the prosecutor should be accepted, whether to testify-among
many others). Then there are the social and individualized justice concerns about
sentencing-concerns that are difficult in gross but excruciating in the sympathetic
prism of an individual's (even a criminal individual's) life. To explore some of the
legal policy as well as the trial and appellate advocacy issues, this essay reports in
detail the facts (to the extent they are known) and the outcomes of two recent Flor-
ida child sexual abuse prosecutions: the appeal of Mark Lee Gibson's conviction;
3
and the originating events and pre-trial and post-conviction stages of the prosecu-
tion of Ramon Garcia.4 The Garcia case may not be representative of the 101 con-
victions for capital sexual battery in Dade County during 1996;5 nor is the Gibson
3 The opinions can be found at Gibson v. State, 721 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), and
Gibson v. State, 835 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (opinion affirming denial of post-
conviction relief).
4 This essay is taken from my larger empirical study of child sexual abuse prosecution practice
in two judicial districts in Florida and one in North Carolina. The larger study, as well as this essay,
were funded by a generous grant from the Smith-Richardson Foundation. Another aspect of the
larger study is reported in Levy, supra note 2. Because descriptions of the Garcia case include facts
taken from the prosecutor's file, names have been changed to insure confidentiality. See infra note
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Florida, and Dade County (Miami) specifically, have been in the child sexual abuse prosecu-
tion spotlight for more than fifteen years, with widespread media coverage, a host of editorial criti-
cisms, and attacks on Janet Reno, then the Dade County "State Attorney" (the elected chief prosecu-
tor) and later United States Attorney General. Three notorious criminal prosecutions were widely
publicized. Francisco Fuster, proprietor with his wife of an unlicensed baby-sitting service, the
Country Walk school, was prosecuted for sexually abusing clients of the service. Fuster's wife
pleaded guilty and testified against him; Fuster later claimed that his wife had been held in jail, na-
ked and incommunicado and under extremely coercive circumstances, until she confessed. Later,
after being deported, Mrs. Fuster recanted but refused to return to the United States to testify.
Fuster's subsequent appeals and habeas corpus motions were all denied. See, e.g., Fuster v. State,
664 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). In 1984, Harold Snowden, a decorated Miami policeman
whose wife ran a baby-sitting service from their home, was prosecuted after he "sat in" for his wife
on one occasion and one of the parents (whose parenting he had criticized) complained that
Snowden had sexually abused that parent's child. Several children, "encouraged" by therapists to
"disclose," testified that they had been abused, but Snowden was acquitted. A second trial, respect-
ing a different victim, resulted in a hung jury; finally, a jury convicted Snowden of abusing still a
third victim despite the fact that the first child victim had recanted his allegations (a fact about
which the trial judge refused to permit testimony). Snowden's direct appeals were all unsuccessful;
but, after eleven years in prison, his conviction was reversed and he was freed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732 (11 th Cir.
1998). See also Dorothy Rabinowitz, The Pursuit of Justice in Dade County, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28,
1996, at A18; Editorial, "Nightmare's End," WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1998, at A18 (prosecutors an-
nounce Snowden will not be re-prosecuted). In 1989, Robert Finje, a fourteen-year-old church day
care worker, was tried as an adult for sexually abusing a three-year-old. After extensive pre-trial
proceedings and a three and a half month trial (financed for the defendant, at a cost of more than
$500,000, by the church's insurance company), the boy was acquitted. See The Bobby Finje Case,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1996, at A18, col 1.
5 Many more prosecutions, which resulted in convictions for some lesser included offenses,
contained capital sexual battery counts when initiated. See infra text accompanying notes 108-13. 1
have records for only a sample of the 1996 Dade County prosecutions and have no trial transcript or
other records of capital sexual battery appeals. One additional caveat: the Gibson case discussion is
based on the opinions, supplemented by telephone conversations with the prosecutor and public
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case necessarily representative of the more than 70 capital sexual battery appeals
from convictions decided by Florida appellate courts between 1998 and 2002. The
Gibson case was chosen for discussion here because it was the most recent deci-
sion reported when the legal doctrine research phase of the larger study began; the
Garcia case was chosen because, while conducting case file research for the larger
study, I was invited by the prosecutor to attend the hearing on the defendant's mo-
tion for post-conviction relief,6 and the case file contained more detail and tran-
scribed depositions and hearings than any of the cases selected randomly for the
larger study.
Yet these cases merit intensive scrutiny. They illustrate dramatically the high
stakes tactical decisions such cases force on prosecutors and defense lawyers and
the high stakes risks they pose for defendants. The Gibson case shows how rules of
evidence can influence jury behavior; the Garcia case shows how pre-trial lawyer-
ing, as well as rules of evidence and prosecutorial practices, constrain or enhance
defender and review of a small sample of the trial transcript. Discussion of the Garcia case and its
legal strategies is based on documents in the file of the prosecutor (supplemented by only one inter-
view). Inappropriate inferences may have been drawn about the trial strategies of the prosecutor or
defense counsel. Needless to say, persistent efforts have been made to avoid errors.
6 See infra text following note 113.
7 There is a "generalizability" risk other than the nature of the sample worth discussing. As the
title of this article indicates, the subject is the crime of child sexual abuse and the dynamics of its
prosecution may be different than that of others. Actual data are hard to come by, needless to say.
But there is continuing and heated controversy (perhaps true of most subjects of criminal prosecu-
tion) as to whether prosecutors fail to prosecute too many cases and whether sentences are, in gen-
eral, too light or too heavy. In the cognate field of statutory rape, for example, some advocates criti-
cize prosecutors for failure to prosecute enough adults who have sexual intercourse with minors
(see, e.g.,SHARON G. ELSTEIN and Noy DAVIS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE
LAW, SEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ADULT MALES AND YOUNG TEEN GIRLS: EXPLORING THE
LEGAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSES 25, 30 (1997)), while others criticize prosecutors for ignoring the
wishes of victims in deciding whether to prosecute (see, e.g., Rigel Oliveri, Statutory Rape Law and
Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 STAN. L. REv. 463, 484 (2000)). See generally,
Levy, supra note 2, at 18-28. Prosecutors tend to explain failures to prosecute marginal cases by
citing to weak evidence, to witnesses who are not credible or fail to cooperate (see FRANK D. CAN-
NAVALE, WrrNESS COOPERATION xv (1976)), or to those judges who are unduly sympathetic to de-
fendants (see Levy, supra note 2, at 15 n.9); defense attorneys tend to attribute vindictiveness and
uncontrolled prosecutorial and correctional passion to prosecutors. Anecdotal information suggests
that rates of prosecution and conviction of child sexual abuse crimes as well as severity of sentences
vary from state to state and from community to community. For example, I was told by a prosecutor
in a mountainous area of a rural state: "We prosecute only cases we consider 'no-brainers' and still
we lose more than fifty percent of our trials. And it's because in most of our juries there's somebody
who's thinking something like 'there but for the grace of God go I or somebody close to me."' To
whatever extent "public opinion" can be considered a surrogate for data on these issues, it seems
likely that rates of prosecution and conviction, as well as sentence severity should all have increased
in recent decades. See PHILLIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLES-
TER IN MODERN AMERICA 16 (1998): "After the mid-1970s, public opinion moved in the opposite
direction [from the 'Liberal Era, 1958-76'], with renewed perceptions of alleged threats to women
and especially children." Jenkins describes American attitudes toward molesters and molestation as
having varied, in an irregular tidal fashion, influenced by a variety of broader community attitudes
toward freedom of sexual expression, therapy and therapists, family and religious values, influenc-
ing and being influenced by pressure group advocacy and media treatment of the issues.
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defendants' chances of being acquitted by a jury. The two cases illustrate both the
value, and the terrible dangers, of aggressive criminal defense tactics. The Gibson
case indicates how dangerous it is for lawyers and their criminal clients to rely on
appellate review of jury findings of guilt. Both cases indicate how freedom of tac-
tical choice for criminal defendants can produce unpleasant consequences. These
cases, like many criminal prosecutions, because of their fascinating and complex
individuality, seem to remain impenetrable mysteries of human motivation and
behavior, in part the product of indeterminate tactical choices.
Above all else, the Gibson and Garcia cases with all their idiosyncrasies
prove how useful to prosecutors and how coercive to defendants are "mandatory
minimums." Sentences that threaten defendants with life in prison if they "roll the
dice," opting for trial rather than the prosecutor's plea offer of a lesser (but not
necessarily insignificant) penalty, play a powerful, often decisive, role in determin-
ing defendants' realistic options. At the same time, mandatory minimums, in the
hands of prosecutors willing to bargain, can produce idiosyncratic variations in the
outcomes of prosecutions and in the sentences of defendants charged with similar
criminal behavior. Prior to trial in the Gibson case, the prosecutor offered the de-
fendant a plea to "attempted capital sexual battery" with a sentence of fifteen years
in prison followed by an equal period of probation; 8 Gibson refused the pre-trial
offer as well as a post-trial offer of twenty-five years if he waived his right to ap-
peal. Gibson is in prison for life. Garcia, on the other hand, accused of a crime
with the same penalty, agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a "credit for time
served" probationary sentence of only the forty-two days he had spent in jail prior
to a bail hearing, plus a number of conditions of probation. 9 This is not to suggest
that the charges against Gibson and Garcia were identical, or even that the evi-
dence against each was equally likely to produce a conviction after trial. 10 None-
theless, whether a bargained plea induced, or, at least, encouraged by draconian
penalties if the defendant goes to trial should be considered "voluntary" would be
an issue worth serious exploration-if the Supreme Court of the United States had
not obviated the issue by rejecting such claims out of hand.' But the coercive in-
fluence on both Gibson and Garcia of the penalty for the crime of "capital sexual
8 See infra text accompanying note 60.
9 See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 121-26 and accompanying text.
1 See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978) (murder prosecution; bargain to avoid death
penalty approved); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (murder prosecution; bargain ap-
proved); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutor promised not to recommend
sentence as part of plea bargaining; case remanded for further proceedings when prosecutor made
recommendations anyway). The standard description of a voluntary plea was stated in Shelton v.
United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (reversed on confession of error on other grounds, 356
U.S. 26 (1958)): "IA] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including
the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor or his own counsel, must
stand, unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresenta-
tion (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature
improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g., bribes)." See generally
YALE KAMiSAR, ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1232-89 ( 10th ed. 2002).
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battery"-a crime which produces revulsion even among incarcerated criminals
12
as well as the ordinary citizens who populate juries-cannot be ignored.
I. THE STATUTE
Prosecutions of child sexual abusers in Florida arise under one or another
subsection of two felony statutes. The more important but less frequently utilized
crime is known as "capital sexual battery" because it imposes as a penalty a man-
datory sentence of life without parole. The statute punishes any person older than
eighteen who engages in "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the
sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other
object," if the victim is a "person less than twelve years of age."' 13 The "capital"
designation persists because the statute appears to permit the death penalty for the
crime. Following Furman v. Georgia14 and Coker v. Georgia,15 the Florida Su-
preme Court held that the death sentence is a grossly disproportionate and exces-
sive punishment for sexual battery of a child. 16 Despite the invalidation, "the Flor-
ida Legislature never changed the wording of the sexual battery statute. Thus, upon
reading the statute today it would appear that the death penalty could be imposed
for those convicted of capital sexual battery."17 Intent upon conveying a harsh mes-
sage:
effective October 1, 1995, the legislature amended section
775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1995), so that all capital felonies not
resulting in the death penalty are subject to a mandatory sentence of
12 See Daniel Wakin and Katie Zezima, Abusive Ex-Priest is Killed in Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 2003, at Al.
13 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 794.01 1(1)(h), (2) (West 1992). The definition section of the statute
reads in full: "'Sexual battery' means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual
organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual
battery does not include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose." Id. Although some of the
earlier Florida appellate decisions seemed to confuse the legislative language, recent cases have
fairly uniformly construed the statute to be satisfied by the touching of ("union with") a female vic-
tim's vagina or anus by a male's penis, but to require penetration of the vagina or anus digitally or
by some other object. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. State, 754 So. 2d 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Rich-
ards v. State, 738 So. 2d 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Resolving a long-standing disagreement
among intermediate appellate decisions, the Florida Supreme Court ruled, in Welsh v. State, 850 So.
2d 467 (Fla. 2003), that for prosecutions initiated prior to statutory amendments in 1999, "lewd,
lascivious, or indecent assault," prohibited by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1997), is not a
"lesser included offense" of capital sexual battery. In 1999, the legislature had deleted from §
794.011 the phrase "without committing the crime of sexual battery," thus allowing defendants to
have juries charged that they might be convicted of the lesser offense.
14 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
'5 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
16 Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981). Actually, the conclusion was dictum because
the death sentence, imposed on the defendant by the judge, despite ajury recommendation of life in
prison, was affirmed because the defendant had murdered the child after committing sexual battery.
id. at 951, 954.
17 Gibson v. State, 721 So. 2d 363, 367 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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life without possibility of parole. Thus, all capital felonies are now
punishable either by death[] by execution or by imprisonment until
death. "8
The "capital" label, even if it does not portend the death penalty, nonetheless sig-
nificantly influences the criminal process: a mandatory life sentence without possi-
bility of parole could well be seen even by innocent defendants and their counsel
as so severe as to compel a plea bargain for some lesser penalty to avoid the vaga-
ries of a jury verdict; a defendant charged with a capital offense in Florida is not
entitled to bail except under very special, and court-created, circumstances, 19 a
situation which adds substantially to the pressure on defendants to plea bargain; as
mentioned above, the nature of the offense and the severity of the penalty can af-
fect the lawyers, judges, and even, occasionally, the jury.
H. THE GIBSON APPEAL
Consider the circumstances of Mark Lee Gibson, a twenty-three-year-old, who
appealed his conviction of capital sexual battery to Florida's Second District Court
of Appeal in 1998.20
Gibson was arrested when his eight-year-old stepdaughter, after watching a
television program involving a sexual molestation, told her mother that "'daddy'
had touched her butt." Although Gibson admitted to his wife that he had "messed
with" the girl, Gibson was not arrested until a few days later when the girl's
grandmother was told about the incident. The deputy sheriff read Gibson his
Miranda rights, 21 explaining that the warning is "a lot of legal garbage but it basi-
cally comes down to the point that you don't have to talk to me if you don't want
to." In response to the deputy's question, Gibson confessed to the charged physical
behavior-that on several occasions and in a number of locales he had had sexual
experiences with his stepdaughter: his penis came in contact with her vagina and
there were a variety of other sexual contacts between the two.22 Gibson's convic-
18 Id. at 368. The death penalty issue in child sexual battery cases is still very much alive (so to
speak). See Adam Liptak, Louisiana Sentence Renews Debate on the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2003, at A20; State v. Kennedy, 854 So. 2d 296 (La. 2003) (death penalty for man who
raped an eight year old affirmed; sentence later changed to life in prison); State v. Wilson, 685 So.
2d 1063 (La. 1996) (trial court quashing of death penalty indictment for rape of child because death
penalty for crime unconstitutional reversed), cert. denied, sub nom. Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S.
1259 (1997) (three Justices issued unusual statement that denial of certiorari does not constitute a
ruling on the merits). The Kennedy case was later plea bargained to a life sentence. See Liptak, su-
pra.
19 See infra note 72.
20 Gibson v. State, 721 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). All facts in the text are taken
from this opinion.
21 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22 "Okay. So, your penis has actually touched her vaginal area? I'm not saying up inside, but
it's touched the lips of her vaginal area?" Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 364. The confession included ad-
missions to similar sexual contacts, the defendant's hand touching the victim's vagina and bottom
and the victim's hand touching the defendant's penis, in judicial districts other than Tampa (Hills-
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tion, when he opted for a trial, was predictable: the child was the first and, accord-
ing to the appellate court, a credible witness. A printed version of Gibson's confes-
sion was read to the jury; medical testimony explained that Gibson's "union with"
the girl's vagina rather than penetration was "consistent with' 23 the absence of
traumatic injury to her vagina as well as the intact nature of her hymen.24 Beyond
the evidence, many Florida criminal defense attorneys believe that capital sexual
battery defendants have little chance of acquittal by a jury no matter how weak the
prosecutor's case.
There were at least colorable procedural, substantive and constitutional rea-
sons for reversing Gibson's conviction on appeal. In the first place, the trial judge
denied a request for continuance on the verge of trial although the public defender
had just assigned a new lawyer to Gibson's case:
The original information in this case charged Mr. Gibson with three
counts of capital sexual battery based on penile penetration, and oral
union. The information included a fourth count of lewd and lascivi-
ous conduct based on Mr. Gibson's request to have the child touch
his penis. On the Friday before trial in June 1997, the State amended
the information to allege two counts of capital sexual battery, drop-
ping the charge of oral union. The amended information included
three counts of lewd and lascivious conduct, adding charges based
on improper contact with the victim's buttocks and fondling the vic-
tim's vagina. It is clear that the State was not adding any new inci-
dents to the information, but was merely attempting to reconfigure
the charges arising out of the events as reported in January.
On Monday, immediately preceding trial, Mr. Gibson moved for a
continuance. Although he was concerned with the amendment to the
information, he was primarily concerned that the public defender
had unilaterally assigned a new assistant public defender to defend
his capital felony charges only one working day before the trial. The
trial court denied the continuance, maintaining that the policy deci-
25sion of the public defender's office was not the court's concern.
borough County), where the charges were originally brought. Id. at 364-65 (behavior in the other
districts could not be prosecuted in Hillsborough County.)
23 For discussion of such testimony, see infra note 83.
24 For the statutory basis for "union with" liability, see supra note 13. The victim testified with
conviction that the defendant's penis had penetrated her vagina "halfway" "two or three times" and
that it hurt "sometimes." The expert testimony might have (but apparently did not) caused a problem
by suggesting that the prosecutor may have been unwilling to rely on the victim's penetration testi-
mony. Transcript of Trial Testimony, State of Florida v. Gibson, June 9, 1997, p. 52 (copy on file
with the University of Minnesota Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Transcript of Trial Testimony].
25 Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 365. As to lewd and lascivious conduct as a "lesser included offense,"
see supra note 13. For additional information about the continuance issue and the dispute to which
it led in a hearing on Gibson's motion for post-conviction relief, see infra note 48 and infra notes
49-50 and accompanying text.
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The court of appeals affirmed-agreeing with the trial judge that the public
defender had been assigned to represent Gibson, not any particular lawyer, and the
defender office's internal assignment practices were not sufficient cause for a con-
tinuance, even on the verge of trial. 26 It is true that after jury selection Gibson's
original lawyer aided in his representation, 27 there was no evidence from the trans-
cript alone that Gibson's defense had been mishandled,28 and, in any event, it was
settled law that issues of ineffective assistance of the newly assigned lawyer could
be examined only by motion for post-conviction relief rather than by appeal.29 Yet
everyone agrees that lawyers play a vital role in protecting defendants, especially in
complex or difficult cases, and an unprepared lawyer cannot fulfill the role;30 that
Gibson's conviction involved a most serious sentence, one the court of appeals
itself described as "death by imprisonment;, 31 and that the prosecutor, the jury, and
even the court of appeals panel apparently had some concern as to the propriety of
imposing such a penalty on Gibson.32 Many lawyers believe that judicial manipula-
tion of evidentiary, procedural, even constitutional precedent is influenced by the
specific facts of the cases and by judges' assessments of the defendant's guilt.
Given the circumstances (and especially the information the appellate opinion re-
ported about the trial's ending), such lawyers might well be surprised that the court
of appeals judges were unwilling to cut Gibson some slack. The panel could have
26 Id. at 366.
27 Id. at 365.
28 But see infra notes 48 and 50.
29 Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 365-66. See Cox v. State, 354 So. 2d 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
United States Supreme Court precedent was also cited. See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648 (1984) (last minute substitution of trial counsel does not automatically render assistance ineffec-
tive). In the Cronic case, the defendant claimed that counsel was young and inexperienced and given
only twenty-five days to prepare, that the charges were grave and serious and witnesses were not
easily accessible. Yet these facts alone did not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel in
the absence of a showing of actual ineffectiveness. See also infra note 30.
The court of appeals also rejected Gibson's claim that he had not knowingly and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights-although the deputy had characterized the decision as "legal garbage"
and despite the fact that he had not been warned that the crime carried a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 364. Gibson's lawyer
did not file a motion to suppress his confession and failed to object to its introduction into evidence.
In the post-conviction relief proceeding, see infra notes 48 and 50, both of Gibson's trial lawyers
testified that no objection had been made to admissibility of his confessions because there was no
good faith basis for such an objection. See Transcript of Proceeding on Motion for Post-Conviction
Relief, in State v. Gibson, June 8, 2000, pp. 67, 160-63 (on file with author) [hereinafter cited as
Post-Conviction Relief Transcript]. Gibson's claim that his waiver was invalid was legally incorrect.
Gibson, 721 So. 2d 363. A defendant's failure to object to a confession under most circumstances
waives even constitutional objections to its admissibility. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 692 So. 2d
930 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (in capital cases United States Supreme Court requires express waiv-
ers and record showing that waiver was knowingly and inteliigently made; Florida capital sexual
battery is capital in name only and therefore judge has no obligation to inquire of defendant as to
waiver).30 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648
(1984). See infra note 48 and 50 and accompanying test.
31 Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 368 n.14.
32 See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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ordered a new trial on some narrow basis such as denial of defense counsel's re-
quest for additional trial preparation time,33 so that Gibson could at least have re-
visited his decision not to accept "an unusual post-verdict proposal from the State
that he plead guilty to a lesser included offense and waive his appellate rights in
exchange for a sentence" of twenty-five years,34 less than life without parole, to be
sure, but still onerous.
35
Gibson's most substantial claim was that a mandatory sentence of life without
the possibility of parole for a defendant with no prior convictions, even one con-
victed of sexual union with a child, constitutes either "cruel or unusual punish-
ment" under Article I, Section 17 of the Florida Constitution, or "cruel and unusual
punishment" within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.36 Here Gibson garnered more sympathy from the jury
that convicted him, and, to some limited extent perhaps, even from the prosecutor.
As the jury was leaving the courtroom, the prosecutor was overheard agreeing with
the judge that the penalty for Gibson's crime was life without the possibility of
parole. The jury returned to the courtroom and a most unusual exchange ensued:
One of the jurors, not the foreperson, made a passionate speech, ex-
plaining that the jury concluded that something bad had happened in
the child's home, but that the misconduct was not entirely Mr. Gib-
son's fault. Near the end of his speech, the juror said:
We feel the defendant deserves to be punished. I heard you say
something about a life sentence. He doesn't deserve a life sentence.
I hope it is not a mandatory life sentence. If I would have known
that, I don't think I would have voted guilty for it. If I were King, I
would take this child and put it with a different family altogether
and hope that she had a great life. This is not to disparage your son
[apparently addressing the defendant's mother] or Mrs. Gibson. It's
just a very sad situation, and we're all very concerned for the wel-
fare of the child.
33 See infra note 48.
34 Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 366.
35 A court more sympathetic to the defendant's correctional plight might also have found the
deputy's Miranda warning inadequate and therefore a sufficient procedural hook on which to hang a
new trial. Florida appellate court rulings on Miranda issues have not been noticeably consistent.
Compare State v. Kobielnik, 765 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (statements made by defen-
dant while in police custody were involuntary and should have been suppressed), with State v. Kol-
tay, 659 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (question about defendant's presence at mental
health center which enlisted inculpatory statement that "I'm not crazy just because I f----d a little
girl," was not custodial interrogation designed to elicit confessions which would require Miranda
warning) and State v. Orlando Vocal Feroben, 677 So. 2d 980 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (defend-
ant's admission after Miranda warning and during informal interrogation but prior to elicited formal
and taped statement was admissible even though defendant retracted admission during formal state-
ment).36 U.S. CONST. amends. VIII and XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17. The possibility that the
Florida and the federal norm imposed on the state differs is explored in note 44 infra.
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Then the juror turned to the other jurors and said: "Does anybody
have anything they may want to add, or did I sum it up pretty well?"
The court reporter then placed in the transcript the comment, "Ju-
rors indicating affirmatively."
The trial court imposed the mandatory life sentence at a later hear-
ing, after Mr. Gibson had rejected an unusual post-verdict proposal
from the State that he plead guilty to some offense and waive his
appellate rights in exchange for a sentence of imprisonment with the
possibility of release after 25 years.
37
Even the court of appeals, rejecting Gibson's constitutional claim, expressed some
reservation about the mandatory minimum: "Although the issue is close and this
extreme penalty may cause some intrafamilial crimes to go unreported, we con-
clude that the penalty is not cruel or unusual. ' ' 38 The opinion ended with a similar
rhetorical flourish:
Thus, there is a possibility this inflexible mandatory penalty of life
imprisonment may result in fewer convictions for this type of sexual
predation than a more flexible penalty. As a result, this more severe
punishment may ultimately prove to be a lesser deterrent than a
more flexible penalty. These concerns, however, are matters for
consideration by the legislature and do not affect this court's consti-
tutional analysis.
39
To decide the Eighth Amendment issue, the court of appeals applied the ob-
jective criteria found in United States Supreme Court opinions: "(i) the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (ii) the sentences imposed on other
37 Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 365-66. That the jurors were left in ignorance of the sentence for the
crime was in accord with settled Florida law. See Dailey v. State, 501 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (prosecution for capital sexual battery; jury instructions on maximum and minimum sentences
requested by defendant properly refused since offense no longer punishable by death). See also infra
note 102 and accompanying text. In light of the condition that Gibson waive his appellate rights, it
is possible that the prosecutor's offer was occasioned by concern that one of the issues or all of them
together-denial of a continuance, the Eighth Amendment claim, the jury's recorded objection to
the mandatory sentence-might be sufficient for reversal of the conviction on appeal. Gibson's re-
fusal to accept the post-trial "deal" could have been based on his judgment as to his chances of get-
ting the conviction reversed. If these speculations are accurate, both the prosecutor and Gibson's
lawyers were mistaken. (Of course, the public defenders had some reputational stake in Gibson's
decision-if the appellate court were to decide that the representation was constitutionally ineffec-
tive.) The prosecutor remembers that the public defender testified at Gibson's sentencing hearing
that he had urged Gibson to accept the post-trial offer. See interview with Michael Sinacore, Es-
quire, Assistant State Attorney, dated September 17, 2003 (on file in the University of Minnesota
Law Library). In fact, Post-Conviction Relief Transcript, pp.27, 149, indicates only that both of
Gibson's lawyers encouraged him to accept the prosecutor's last pre-trial plea offer. Gibson's appeal
and motion for post-conviction relief were handled by a subsequently hired private lawyer.
38 Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 367.
39 Id. at 370.
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criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions." 4
40 Id. at 368. The major interpretations of the Amendment when the Gibson case was decided
were Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); and
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). The Constitutional environment was not unambiguous. In
Rummel, the defendant was sentenced to life under a recidivist statute for three petty felonies (for
which the defendant obtained, successively, $80 worth of goods and services, $28.36, and
$120.75); a majority held the statute constitutional with the comment that "one could argue with-
out fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and
classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant imprisonment in a state penitentiary,
the length of the sentences actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 445 U.S.
at 274. Three years later, in Solem, a bare majority held unconstitutional under a "proportionality"
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment (incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied
against the States, of course) the life imprisonment without possibility of parole of Solem, a South
Dakota recidivist, for successive offenses that included three convictions of third degree burglary,
one of obtaining money by false pretenses, one of grand larceny, one of driving while intoxicated
and one of writing a "no account" check with intent to defraud. 463 U.S. at 291-92. Harmelin was
convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in
prison without possibility of parole. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957. A balkanized Court upheld the sen-
tence despite the fact that the defendant was a first offender. Justices Scalia and Rehnquist held
that the history of the Eighth Amendment proved that "proportionality" evaluation of criminal stat-
utes was not contemplated, that Solem was incorrectly decided, and that "we have drawn the line of
required individualized sentencing at capital cases, and see no basis for extending it further." Id. at
996. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter concurred, finding that the Eighth Amendment en-
compasses "a narrow proportionality principle" whose "precise contours are unclear," but that sev-
eral principles-"the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the
nature of our federal system, and the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objec-
tive factors"--dictate that the Amendment "does not require strict proportionality between crime
and sentence." Id. at 998-1000. The concurrence then concluded that because of the amount of co-
caine the defendant possessed and the danger to individuals and the society of illegal drugs, the
defendant's sentence, although harsh, was not unconstitutionally disproportional. The four dissent-
ing Justices were equally fractured. Justice White's dissenting opinion, which Justices Blackmun
and Stevens joined, disagreed with Justice Scalia' s historical and policy analyses and held that the
statute as applied violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1009-27. More recently, in a federal ha-
beas corpus proceeding, Andrade v. Lockyer, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001), challenging Califor-
nia's Career Criminal Punishment Act, known as the "Three Strikes Law," which when charged
makes a third offense punishable by life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for twenty-five
years, a 2-1 majority of a Ninth Circuit panel held the statute unconstitutional. The defendant's
prior convictions were for petty theft of merchandise worth approximately $150, charges elevated
to felonies by the prosecutor. The prosecution which triggered the defendant's two consecutive life
sentences was for two additional petty thefts of nine videotapes from two K-Mart stores. The court
of appeals decision was reversed in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); a 5-4 majority held
that the constitutionality of the state statute did not have to be decided since habeas corpus should
not have been granted because a federal statute bars such grants unless the state decision
(Andrade's conviction) "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States"-and under the cases described above "our cases exhibit a lack of clarity regarding what
factors may indicate gross disproportionality." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71. A companion case, Ewing
v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) was a direct appeal from a sentence of 25 years to life for a de-
fendant, charged with stealing three golf clubs, who had a lengthy record and frequent imprison-
ments. Justice O'Connor, writing only for herself, the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, followed
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Harmelin and found that because of Ewing's lengthy record
and frequent incarcerations, his sentence was not the kind of grossly disproportionate sentence the
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Using these measures, the court of appeals deemed it appropriate to give
"broad deference to the substantive penological policies announced by the state
legislature.",4' "Child sexual predation is a serious concern. . . . Even when it
leaves no physical scars, it can create emotional damage that lasts a lifetime. There
is evidence that victims of abuse become abusers and that this crime can transmit
its injuries across generations. 42 Moreover, there is need for a harsh penalty, and
"there is little question that Florida has a history of imposing lengthy prison sen-
,,43
tences for many offenses. Finally, although Florida imposes a more severe pen-
alty for child sexual abuse than do its neighboring states, all states provide exten-• 4 3
sive penalties. The court of appeals acknowledged that the Florida Constitution
contains its own "cruel or unusual punishment" provision, and the provision re-
quires "proportionality review." 44 Suppose the court of appeals had been more
Eighth Amendment prohibits. Justices Scalia and Thomas found no disproportionality principle in
the Amendment; four Justices dissented, including Justice Souter, who had joined the majority in
Harmelin. For more information about Florida's and other states' constitutional norms as to exces-
sive punishment, see infra note 44.
4'Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 370.
42 Id. at 368. For some evidence that these conclusions are controversial, disputed within the
social science community and not universally accepted as true, see Robert J. Levy, Discretionary
Prosecution of Child Sexual Abusers: Adolescent Victims, 17 BAR ILAN LAW STUDIES 7, 50 n. 122
(2002); PHILLIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OFTHE CHILD MOLESTER IN AMERICA
16 (1998) (calling belief about life-long damage "a new and unassailable social orthodoxy").
41 Id. at 369.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 367. In Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993) the Florida Supreme Court con-
firmed that "proportionality" review is appropriate under the Florida Constitution, but that there
was no need to delineate the precise contours of the "arguably... broader [Florida] constitutional"
provision in this case because a concurrent sentence of two ten to twenty-five year terms for a drug
dealer was clearly not disproportionate to the crime. The court also reaffirmed its commitment to
the proposition in Leftwich v. State, 589 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), that "[t]he
length of the sentence actually imposed is generally said to be a matter of legislative prerogative."
As the Gibson opinion indicates, subsequent cases continued to emphasize the United State Su-
preme Court decisions and to make no noticeable use of the "and/or" distinction between the state
and federal punishment clauses. See supra note 3 1.
In Jones v. State, 701 So. 2d 76 (1997) (4-3 decision), the Florida Supreme Court decided that
capital punishment by electrocution is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment or Florida's "cruel
or unusual punishment" constitutional prohibition. The litigation, filed by a person sentenced to
death, was occasioned by the most recent electrocution during which flames were observed near
the headpiece of the electric chair and smoke emanated from under the headpiece. Apparently con-
cerned and energized by hints in the dissenting opinions, the legislature promulgated an amend-
ment to the Constitution which added to Section 17, the Excessive Punishment provision, the fol-
lowing language: "The death penalty is an authorized punishment for capital crimes designated by
the Legislature. The prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, and the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, shall be construed in conformity with decisions of the United States
Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Any method of execution shall be al-
lowed, unless prohibited by the United States Constitution. Methods of execution may be desig-
nated by the legislature, and a change in any method of execution may be applied retroactively."
After the amendment was enacted in the general election of 1998, the Florida Supreme Court, in
another 4-3 decision, declared the provision invalid because the ballot summary did not state the
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sympathetic to Gibson's plight because he was a first offender and because the jury
claimed it would have decided the case differently had it known the impending
penalty; and suppose the court of appeals had concluded that because Florida had
adopted an arguably broader constitutional provision,'45 under all the circum-
stances, the legislature's mandatory minimum "death by imprisonment" was cruel
or unusual as applied to Gibson. Is it possible that the court of appeals decision
would have been reversed by the Florida Supreme Court? Perhaps. Four years
later, the trial court's denial of Gibson's motion for post-conviction relief based on
ineffective assistance of counsel was affirmed by a severely divided three judge
panel of the court of appeals. 46 The opinion for the court concluded that because
Gibson had not shown he was prejudiced 47 by his representation, defense counsel's
performance did not have to be reviewed specifically. Gibson was not in fact
prejudiced: the victim testified; Gibson confessed to law enforcement authorities;
at the post-conviction hearing, both counsel testified that they were prepared for
trial; and cross-examining the victim with broad, open-ended questions, which al-
lowed her to testify to uncharged offenses, was a justified tactical decision de-
signed to confuse the witness. 48 The concurring judge voted to deny relief, al-
main effect or the chief purpose of the provision adequately, and therefore it did not comply with
an "accuracy" requirement. See Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, sub.
nom. Harris v. Armstrong 532 U.S. 958 (2001). The provision was resubmitted to the voters in the
2002 general election and was passed.
Other state supreme courts have paid more attention to the "and/or" distinction. See, e.g.,
People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (1991) (statute held constitutional in Harmelin case held un-
constitutional under Michigan cruel or unusual punishment constitutional provision in case factu-
ally very similar to Harmelin); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (1972) (cruel or unusual pun-
ishment language should be given its ordinary meaning).
In general, the state cruel and/or unusual cases-most of them evaluating sentences to life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole (sometimes called "LWOP" sentences) of juvenile offend-
ers waived to adult court for very serious offenses-cite and track the United States Supreme Court
cases and leave complete sentencing discretion to state legislatures except in death cases. There are
a very few variant decisions. See, e.g., Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989) (life without
parole sentence for mentally and emotionally disordered thirteen-year-old seventh grader who pled
guilty to an unspecified degree of murder is cruel and unusual punishment See generally BARRY C.
FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 540-555 (2000). See also Wayne A. Logan, Proportion-
ality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681
(1998).
45 See supra note 44.
46 Gibson v. State, 835 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). Local lawyers refer to post-
conviction relief efforts as "Rule 3.850" [pronounced thirty-eight-fifty] motions, based on the per-
tinent Rule of Criminal Procedure. See Post-Conviction Relief Transcript, supra note 29, at p.5.
47 See infra notes 52-53.48 Gibson, 855 So. 2d at 1160. As is probably true of most appellate opinions, the judge's summary
of the facts was partial and misleading. Both Gibson's newly assigned and his original public de-
fender testified repeatedly during a hearing that lasted two days and included more than 300 pages
of transcript that they were both prepared for trial, that they had met with Gibson several times (for
about three hours on two occasions), that the newly assigned public defender had been present at
the pre-trial depositions of the prosecution's witnesses, and that the two lawyers worked as a team
throughout the trial. See, e.g., Post-Conviction Relief Transcript, supra note 29, at pp. 9, 28, 83,
121, 123, 130-33. The newly assigned attorney claimed that his motion for a continuance at the
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though "several points raised by the dissent are troubling.. . ." Nonetheless, the
concurring opinion pointed out that both defense attorneys "were highly experi-
enced criminal defense lawyers" facing a "weak defense case because of [Gib-
son's] confession;" they had discussed and agreed on a difficult trial strategy, and
the strategy's "success or failure is not the standard by which counsel's perform-
ance must be measured., 49 The Chief Judge dissented:
I am aware that at the evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction
motion, both attorneys testified that they were prepared for trial.
This testimony differed significantly from the representations made
to the court at the time of trial, when the continuance was requested
and the court was informed that through reassignment neither attor-
ney was prepared to represent the defendant on these most serious
charges. I come to my position on this court with some experience
in the courtroom as an attorney and a trial judge. This background
beginning of the trial (see the discussion in the dissenting judge's opinion, in the text accompany-
ing note 50 infra) was occasioned because as the jury was about to be chosen Gibson handed him a
list of witnesses his mother wanted called-and when Gibson later told the judge that he did not
want them called the judge announced that there was no need for a continuance. Id. at 12-15. But
when presented by the prosecutor with the trial transcript, which indicated that the lawyer had re-
quested a continuance with the statement that he had met the defendant for the first time in court
that morning, the lawyer indicated that the transcript was "not factually accurate." Rather, respond-
ing to the prosecutor's question, the lawyer indicated that he did not remember saying that he had
never met Gibson before that morning. Id. at 14. As to the judge's conclusion that Gibson was not
prejudiced by counsel's cross-examination with broad, open-ended questions, the matter is also
much more complex than the opinion acknowledged. Although the cross-examination of the victim
gave her an opportunity to tell the jury about the additional, uncharged sexual abuse, its purpose
was to show, according to Gibson's lawyer, that in her deposition the victim appeared confused
about where the abuse occurred. The cross-examination might, therefore, allow ajudgment of ac-
quittal because there would be no "corpus delicti" (no acts of abuse in Hillsborough County, the
locus of the prosecution), In addition, the child's confusion could be combined with testimony
planned to show that the child' s mother (who initially did not believe her daughter's story) had as a
girl falsely accused her own stepfather of sexual abuse, and that she had persuaded Gibson to con-
fess as consideration for reuniting the family. id. at 20-24, 40-42, 144-45. Both lawyers testified
that their strategy was planned and that the possible benefits of the strategy outweighed its risks.
Id. at 93-95, 182. The difficulty with the defense lawyers' contentions was that in direct testimony
the victim had already testified that at least some of the abuse had occurred in Hillsborough
County. See Transcript of Trial Testimony, supra note 24, at 66. Moreover, in response to one of
Gibson's counsel's questions to the victim about geographic location of the abuse (which, ambigu-
ously, could have appeared to the victim to be asking about type of abuse-"Did he do anything
else to you ... touch you in any way at someplace other than the bed?"), the victim answered,
"Well, he - - licked my vagina." The questions continued: "Q. 'With his mouth?' A. 'Yes, sir.' Q.
'With his tongue, you mean?' A. 'Yes, sir.' Q. 'Where did he do that?' A. 'I can't remember."' Id.
at 69. The results of the cross-examination, eliciting abuse episodes which had been redacted from
the confession (Post-Conviction Relief Transcript, supra note 29, at 87-88), could have disposed
the jury to convict Gibson of the behavior charged. On the other hand, the tactic may have suc-
ceeded, this judge's opinion noted, because the jury acquitted Gibson of one of the counts of capi-
tal sexual battery and one of the counts of lewd and lascivious conduct. Gibson, 835 So. 2d at
1160. Gibson's lawyer claimed that the acquittals were the product of the victim's "waffling" as to
the location of the abuse. Post-Conviction Relief Transcript, supra note 29, at 85.
49 Gibson, 835 So. 2d at 1161-62 (Silberman, J., concurring).
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leads me to the conclusion that the attorney reassigned to another
division, with no more responsibility for Gibson's case, did not pre-
pare for trial. I accept the newly assigned public defender's earlier
representations to the trial court that he was not prepared for trial.
Although the record reflects that both attorneys appeared and tried
the case, I am unable to see how doubling the number of unprepared
attorneys provided effective assistance of counsel....
[T]he jury's reaction to this verdict convinces me that the evidence
was not so overwhelming that we can conclude that Gibson was not
prejudiced by ineffective representation .
Substantive as well as procedural criminal law doctrines added greatly to the
pressure imposed on Gibson, as they impose on all Florida child sexual abuse de-
fendants seeking post-conviction relief. Claims of denial of effective assistance of
counsel are extremely difficult to sustain, whatever the behavior of the defendant's
lawyer. They must be raised by post-conviction motion, after a substantive appeal
has been unsuccessful, when the defendant has usually been imprisoned for a
lengthy period.51 The ineffectiveness criteria for ordering a new trial, taken directly
from United States Supreme Court precedents, are broad and indeterminate and
require a showing of actual prejudice (e.g., that the trial would have come out dif-
ferently),52 a showing that is, at best, very difficult to make.53 The broad criteria
5 0 d. at 1163 (Blue, C.J., dissenting). The lawyer assigned to Gibson just prior to the trial tes-
tified at the post-conviction hearing that he had tried eighteen capital sexual abuse cases in the year
prior to Gibson's trial and obtained acquittals in sixteen of them-all but the two (including Gib-
son' s) in which the defendant had signed a confession. Post-Conviction Relief Transcript, supra
note 29, at 90. It is difficult to rely on feelings or hunches based on reading a transcript; nonethe-
less, the transcript conveys the impression that Gibson's lawyers had a substantial investment in
the post-conviction proceedings in avoiding any stigma that their representation had been inade-
quate. See also supra note 48.
51 See, e.g., Rhue v. State, 693 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (defense counsel's failure
to object to testimony supporting credibility of child victim constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel and case remanded for new trial; conviction had been affirmed on direct appeal, 541 So.
2d 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); trial court denial of motion for post-conviction hearing re-
versed, 603 So. 2d 613 (1992); when new trial ordered, defendant had been in prison for seven
years). Gibson was incarcerated in January and convicted in June, 1997; his conviction was af-
firmed in October, 1998; when denial of his motion for post-conviction relief was affirmed by a
divided court of appeals panel in November, 2002, he had been in prison for almost five years.
52 See Bowman v. State, 748 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). The prejudice test fol-
lowed in Florida and most other states was formulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): "the defendant must show that there is a reason-
able probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." In Bowman, the Florida Court of Appeal held that counsel's failure to present the
defendant's alibi evidence did not prejudice his case.
53 See, e.g., Fannin v. State, 645 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (motion for post-
conviction relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel denied; although defense counsel
failed to object to expert's testimony as to a "pedophile profile," testimony now inadmissible by
virtue of Florida Supreme Court decision in 1993, case was tried in 1990, and, in 1991, five of
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allow appellate judges substantial discretion to deny an effectiveness claim if they
believe the defendant was guilty, whatever his attorney's lapses of proper advo-
cacy. 54 In addition, there is some basis for suspecting that, at least with respect to
the right to effective counsel issues, Florida trial and appellate judges, and perhaps
even some defense lawyers, may not be very favorably disposed to capital sexual
battery defendants. 55 Liberal use of the "harmless error" doctrine-denying a new
eleven Court of Appeal judges, in the decision reversed by the Supreme Court, held that such tes-
timony was admissible; under the circumstances, counsel's failure to object to the testimony was
not unreasonable). But see Gonzalez v. State, 851 So. 2d 859 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (trial court
decision that defendant was not denied effective assistance reversed; state had obtained pre-trial
order prohibiting any witness from testifying concerning prior sexual abuse of victims by someone
other than defendant; defendant's lawyer failed to object to prosecutor's closing argument that vic-
tims would not have known about or been able to describe sexual acts but for defendant's acts with
them).
54 See, e.g., Bowman, 748 So. 2d at 1085 (although the Strickland prejudice test is not always
easy to apply, "considering the totality of the evidence and the substantial amount of corroborating
evidence and the unaffected evidence, we conclude that appellant has failed to carry his burden of
showing prejudice"); Perry v. State, 718 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (prior bad acts tes-
timony not a feature of the trial but only incidental, and, therefore, admitting such testimony was
not fundamental; conviction affirmed). Cf. Rhue, 693 So. 2d 567 (defendant denied effective assis-
tance of counsel because of failure to object to testimony by expert and by victim's mother,
grandmother and great-grandmother, that victim was telling the truth; victim's credibility was piv-
otal issue in the case and substantiating evidence was thin and disputed; "given the significance of
the issue [of the victim's credibility], we must conclude that, but for trial counsel's omissions, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different").
55 See Washington v. State, 687 So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (conviction re-
versed although defendant's lawyer failed to object when prosecutor in closing argument compared
defense to "big lie" as practiced by Joseph Goebbels, propaganda minister back at the time of Ad-
olph Hitler, because, in the context of this case, the prosecutor was apparently trying to bolster a
difficult case which came down to a credibility contest between defendant and his stepdaughter
victim); Pippin v. State, 626 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (trial court's summary
denial of motion for post-conviction relief on ground of ineffective assistance reversed on several
grounds; "we would be remiss in failing to note that appellant's trial counsel.., was reprimanded
repeatedly for his incompetent handling of matters in this court... [and therefore] the trial judge
should closely scrutinize the adequacy of his representation in the trial of this case"); Tucker v.
State, 754 So. 2d 89, 93 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (defendant's complaint that court-appointed
counsel assumed he was guilty and would not present evidence defendant claimed would prove his
innocence did not establish ineffective assistance; "it is of no small import that Tucker had, on at
least one prior occasion, claimed dissatisfaction with another appointed public defender. Such tac-
tics are often employed by defendants to stall the inevitable"); Moore v. State, 693 So. 2d 571 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (post-conviction relief granted on appeal for ineffective assistance; eleven-
year-old stepdaughter recanted claims of abuse in a deposition three months after making them,
claiming that she had been angry with defendant for being too strict with her; mother told police
that girl denied the charges and was accused by police of attempting to change the girl's testimony;
counsel refused defendant's numerous requests that counsel meet with the girl and her mother; trial
judge denied relief because defendant's guilty plea colloquy established that plea was freely and
voluntarily entered and counsel was not ineffective simply because he discontinued investigation
after defendant decided to plead guilty); Lee v. State, 677 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (denial of post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance reversed because trial judge denied
evidentiary hearing although trial counsel had informed defendant "he had no speedy trial rights,
refused repeated requests to file motions asserting speedy trial rights even after the 175-day speedy
trial window closed, and waived the right to speedy trial without appellant's consent... [when]
Vol. 7 No. I
[2005] THE DYNAMICS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTION 73
trial unless the defendant's conviction record contained a fundamental error-
increases appellate court discretion even as it keeps in prison defendants whose
trials may have been tainted.56 Yet the many plea bargains that seem to have been
at least influenced by the life sentence "hammer" have produced no substantial
57judicial concern.
Should Gibson have been convicted and sentenced to prison for life? The
twelve jurors and two trial judges as well as five of the six appellate judges who
considered the facts and the nature of the trial thought he was guilty and fairly
convicted. Only one of the six appellate judges thought he should have had a new
trial. Was his sentence too harsh, under all the circumstances? Only twelve jurors
are on the record on that issue-and their assessment is irrelevant. Gibson will be
in prison for life. What is the problem here? Were prosecutors too quick to proceed
to trial, considering the harshness of the penalty, or were they too recalcitrant to
offer a plea bargain with a sensible (e.g., less onerous than incarceration for fifteen
years) penalty for Gibson's behavior?58 Yet Gibson was surely guilty and, at least
from the evidence provided by the appellate opinions written about his case, there
was no reason to believe that Gibson's behavior was the product of some condition
(alcoholism, mental disease or defect, etc.) that might dispose a jury or a sentenc-
ing judge, even if doing so were legally permissible, to opt for sentencing leni-
ency.59 Were Gibson's public defenders constitutionally ineffective, or perhaps
the record on appeal does not refute" the allegations). See also supra notes 50-54.
56 Admission of similar fact evidence (where defendant's behavior with persons other than the
victim is presented to the jury to show a "common plan" or some similar conclusion under the
Florida version of Federal Rule of Evidence § 404(a)) has been a common subject of appeals from
capital sexual battery convictions and a common reason for their reversal. See, e.g., Griffith v.
State, 723 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Land v. State, 730 So. 2d 856 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999). But see Pedry v. State, 718 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (prosecutor did not make
similar fact evidence a feature of the case). In the Gibson post-conviction relief proceeding, the
trial judge found that whether or not the introduction of similar fact evidence by the prosecution is
reversible error, it is not ineffective assistance of counsel for the defendant's attorney to introduce
such evidence. See supra note 48.
57 See infra text accompanying notes 72-73. But see Gibson, 835 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (2002)
(Blue, C.J. dissenting).
58 The prosecutor made a written pre-trial plea offer, one the prosecutor believes Gibson's
public defenders urged Gibson to accept, of conviction of attempted capital sexual battery with a
sentence of fifteen years in prison followed by fifteen years of probation with standard behavioral
conditions. See letter from Michael Sinacore, Esquire, to Robert J. Levy, dated September 20,
2003 (on file in the University of Minnesota Law Library). See also Post-Conviction Relief Tran-
script, supra note 29, at 27, 149. Gibson's initially appointed lawyer remembered that there was a
first plea offer of twenty to twenty-five years (because of the possibility of charges in other judicial
districts, see supra note 48) that was refused. Id. at 197. In Tampa at the time Gibson was prose-
cuted, and in some other Florida judicial districts, plea bargaining was limited to a written submis-
sion by prosecutors to defense counsel on the eve of trial of a reduced sentence offer on a "take it
or leave it" basis. For a summary of the standard probation conditions in Florida at the time, see
infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
59 Plea bargaining, until recently largely ignored by commentators, has become in recent dec-
ades a significant and controversial topic of academic scholarship and debate. See Y. KAMISAR FT.
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1274-1332(10th ed. 2002). In Gib-
son's case, the judge's role might well have been minimal because, when the judge became ac-
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only unwise, in failing to persuade him to accept the pre-trial offer of fifteen years
in prison in exchange for a guilty plea, or in allowing him to turn down the prose-
cutor' s post-trial offer of twenty-five years? 60 Seldom will enough evidence of the
factual and legal circumstances surrounding a defense attorney's advice to his cli-
ent exist to allow judicial exploration of its adequacy. Even if constitutional and
state appellate doctrine were more restrictive, giving much less tactical and trial
practice decisional discretion to defense attorneys than they do,61 it would be very
difficult forjudges to second guess judgments made by defense attorneys under the
pressures created by an existing indictment, much less those made in the cauldron
of a criminal trial. In any event, rejection of both the prosecutor's pre-trial and
post-trial sentence offers was apparently the defendant's decision rather than his
lawyers' advice.62 And, even if the issues were somehow legally relevant, the fact
quainted with the case, there was no bargaining, but a contested trial. Moreover, the judge had lit-
tle choice of penalty (unless the prosecutor was willing to change the charge) because the legisla-
ture had prescribed a mandatory minimum sentence. To be sure, if the lawyers had met with the
judge in chambers before the trial began, the judge could have expressed his or her views about the
charge, in light of the prescribed sentence, and sought to persuade the prosecutor to seek a different
charge (a lesser included offense) with a less onerous penalty. Defense counsel and prosecutors
admit that at least some judges occasionally intervene in this fashion. Such an intervention could
not have occurred in Gibson's case because, as the report of the post-conviction jury "intervention"
indicated, the judge was apparently not certain of what the legislatively prescribed sentence for
Gibson's sexual battery would be. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Most judges will
publicly deny, often strenuously, that they even occasionally "twist the prosecutor's arm" (and,
clearly, the extent of the practice varies from judge to judge and from community to community).
When a plea bargain has occurred, and the prosecutor, defendant and defense counsel appear be-
fore the judge for a formal plea and "plea colloquy" (to insure that the plea was voluntary, etc.),
judicial intervention of some kind is required because the judge must either accept the plea or re-
ject it (the sentence may be, in the judge's judgment, either too harsh or too lenient to reflect ade-
quately the nature of the criminal behavior). Despite this responsibility, some courts and some
commentators insist that trial judges should not engage in plea bargaining in any fashion. On the
other hand, when a plea bargain is presented, many judges will inquire in chambers of both lawyers
as to the nature of the offense and the agreed penalty, and, if the penalty is deemed too harsh, will
ask for a pre-plea, probation officer pre-sentence investigation, suggesting to the defendant that a
straight plea (which maximizes the judge's sentencing discretion) might be wise if the investigation
is favorable. No one knows how often these judicial sentencing techniques are used-but it is clear
that none of them were available to Gibson and his lawyers. For a path-breaking effort to explore
and understand judicial practices, see A. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,
Part 1, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976). Professor Alschuler reported that in some of the jurisdic-
tions he visited, almost all judges followed prosecutors' recommendations in an overwhelming
proportion of the cases. For a thoughtful description and analysis of the various and inconsistent
academic and judicial attitudes toward this problem, see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 31.8 (3d ed. 2000).
60 See supra notes 48 and 50 and infra note 62.
61 But see the appellate court reversals of convictions in Gonzalez, supra note 53; Rhue, supra
51; and Washington, Moore and Lee, supra note 55.
621 have been told by experienced Florida public defenders that, given Florida post-conviction
relief doctrine (see supra notes 51-55), no responsible defense counsel would urge a defendant
who had confessed and been convicted by a jury to rely on either a direct appeal or a post-
conviction proceeding for relief from a capital sexual battery life sentence. The same informants
claim that, despite their advice, many defendants indulge the fantasy that if their convictions are
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that Gibson's lawyers were willing to testify at the post-conviction relief hearing
that they had in fact been prepared, even though they told the trial judge the oppo-
site when the case was called for trial, suggests that any post-conviction judicial
examination of pre-trial and trial decision-making and advice by defendant's coun-
sel is likely to be summary, affected by judgments about the defendant's guilt, and
inconclusive.
What about the Florida legislature's choice of a mandatory minimum sentence
of life in prison without the possibility of parole for Gibson's offense? There is• • 63
surely widespread criticism of mandatory minimums. But the Florida legislature
chose the death penalty for the offense Gibson admitted committing, the Florida
legislature refused to take off the books a death sentence the state's supreme court
declared unconstitutional, and the Florida legislature authorized modification of
"or" to "and" in the state's constitutional criminal penalty limitation clause, appar-
ently because of a fear that the Supreme Court might use the former phrase to limit
some onerous sentences;64 such a legislature might not consider too harsh an
"LWOP" sentence 65 for Gibson's crime and the public would probably approve as
well.66 Gibson's may be one of those situations that seem inappropriate, if not un-
just, but must be accepted because it is the price of a system that, in general, ac-
complishes its purposes. It may well be that a rational legislator might conclude, as
do many criminal law scholars, that certainty of punishment deters more crime, and
67more efficiently, than does increasing severity of punishment. But legislators
seem, in general, to be more worried about getting reelected (and, therefore, what
use an opponent might make of any vote they cast) than the fine points of criminal
justice policy.68 Who cares if public abhorrence of child sexual abuse and abusers
might decline if the sentence for the crime were reduced? What difference does it
make to legislators whether sexual batteries might increase, whether the social and
financial costs of incarceration might decrease, if the sentence for the crime were
reduced to something less than death by imprisonment? Looking closely enough at
a significant social problem and a severe criminal law response to it leaves as many
reversed on procedural grounds they will be set free. See also supra notes 48 and 50.63 See, e.g., Henry S. Wallace, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice
System: A Legislative Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 158 (March/April 1993);
William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums: Mixing Apples and Or-
anges, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 405 (1992).
64 See supra note 44.
65 id.
66 id.
67 For a brilliant and engaging examination of the extant research, the issues underlying deter-
rence policies, and delineation of a research agenda to throw additional light on the issues, see
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING AND GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIMECON-
TROL 194-209 (1973). The authors' sophisticated analysis is too complex to reduce to a footnote
and makes the statement in the text just short of simplistic.68 See Barry C. Feld, Race Politics and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conserva-
tive "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1452 n.425 (2003) (describing "politicians fear of being
labeled by their opponents as 'soft-on-crime'...." Professor Feld's specific focus is on the rela-
tionship between race and the "politicization of crime.") See also Michael Tonry, Racial Politics,
Racial Disparities and the War on Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 475, 489 (1994).
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questions about political processes as about criminal justice issues.
III. THE Garcia CASE
In January, 1995, when a call to the police initiated the case, Ramon Garcia
was fifty-years-old and had lived with Ms. Estelle Perez and her ten and eight-year-
old daughters of a prior marriage for five years. The girls' father was in prison.
Garcia's own daughter, born to Ms. Perez, was a little over two-years-old. Mr.
Garcia was unemployed, according to the police report, and had one prior convic-
tion, with three counts: battery on a police officer, resisting an officer with vio-
lence, and "loitering" and "prowling. ' '69 On January 7, at 7:00 A.M., a Metro-Dade
detective referred to the department's sexual battery investigators Ms. Perez's call
complaining that Garcia had sexually molested her oldest daughter, Elena:
the victim's mother informed him that the victim had been going
through mood swings and feelings of depression for several months,
and when she would ask the victim what was wrong with her, she
would always respond by saying, "Nothing, I can't tell you." The
victim's mother stated that after a long conversation with her, on
this morning, 01-07-95, which began at approximately 12:00 a.m.,
the victim disclosed to her that the subject molested her on several
occasions. The victim further stated to her mother that between the
months of September and November of 1994, the subject touched
her breasts and vaginal area over her clothing. The victim also
stated that the subject penetrated her anally with his penis.
The victim then stated that the last incident took place at the new
apartment. She stated that she was looking at herself in the mirror
when the subject grabbed her from behind, removed her pants and
panties and forced penile to anal sex against her will...
The detective reported that Elena had not previously told her mother or any family
member: "No, I didn't tell anyone because Ramon told me that if I did, he would
kill my mother."
Within an hour and a half, the investigating detective had met with Ms. Perez
and Elena and interviewed Elena alone; the detective immediately arTanged an ap-
pointment for Elena with the Rape Treatment Center7 ° and set in motion a search
69 All records for the Garcia case, including police reports, deposition and hearing transcripts,
and other documents are on file with the University of Minnesota Law Library and were copied with
the permission of the Dade County Attorney's Criminal File Center. Garcia's prior convictions were
mentioned only once after the police report (called the "A-Form"), in the probable cause bail hear-
ing. Whether it played some role in the plea bargain calculations of the defense lawyer or prosecutor
could not be determined from the file kept by the prosecutor.
70 The Rape Treatment Center, a specialized agency of the University of Miami Medical
School (Jackson Medical Center) does forensic investigations and provides medical and psycho-
logical treatment to adult and child victims of sexual abuse.
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for the defendant which culminated some ten days later (after a private lawyer ar-
ranged the defendant's voluntary surrender) in a police station interview. When the
detective discovered that Garcia's attorney had instructed him not to answer ques-
tions, Garcia was arrested and jailed.
A second interview with the victim provided additional information: the as-
sault had taken place in November while the victim was helping the defendant
move some of the family's possessions to a new apartment and shortly after the
victim asked the defendant to buy her a new backpack. The victim explained that
during the assault, "while his penis was in me, it began to sting a little." Ramon
had bought the backpack for her on the way home. Earlier assaults, involving fon-
dling her breasts and vagina over her clothing but no penetration, occurred earlier
in the family's old apartment. The victim explained again her failure to disclose the
assault earlier: "Ramon told me that if I did he would kill my mother," and "If you
tell your mom I kill both of you."
71
Two days later, Elena told the Rape Treatment Center interviewer, according
to handwritten notes on the Center form, "My stepfather has been having a sexual
relationship with me. He put his penis in my rectum more than 3 times, less than
10 times, last time in November. He touched me also in my breasts and my pri-
vates." On the form's genitals sketch, an arrow indicated that the hymenal opening
was 12 millimeters horizontally and 10 millimeters vertically; checked boxes indi-
cated that there were no old or fresh tears in the hymen, no vaginal secretion or
D/C, and no assessment of the cervix. A written note described a rectal examina-
tion: "no lesions, but decreased anal sphincter tone" (a remark that sparked consid-
erable controversy later).
The next day, January 10, Elena was seen in the Children's Center. The Cen-
ter is an interviewing and counseling adjunct to the Capital Sexual Battery Unit, an
autonomous subdivision of the office of the State Attorney (the elected criminal
prosecutor for the judicial district), and shares Unit offices. The Forensic Child
Specialist repeated the previous day's findings ("No old or fresh tears to hymen; 12
mm by 10 mm opening; decreased anal sphincter tone"). Elena's mother told the
interviewer: since the November move to the new apartment Ramon had not been
living with the family, "but he visits almost every day to see his daughter;" Elena
told Estelle, her mother, that when Ramon took down her pants and put his penis
in her rectum, "he was moving up and down and it hurt her a lot;" "other times
Ramon did similar things to Elena at their old house but not as bad as the time
when they were moving; "the other times Ramon would rub his penis on her but-
tocks and only put it in her rectum a little way;" Ramon told Elena that "if she told
anyone he would kill her and her mother;" Elena "has been sad and crying a lot
since this past October which she attributed to not having her father around;"
Ramon has a gun and "has threatened to kill [Estelle] if he sees her with another
71 The assistant state attorney wrote several comments on the A-Form emphasizing the defen-
dant's threats; the victim's comment that "me and my sisters are afraid of Ramon because he has a
very bad temper" and "when the subject gets upset, he screams which causes the family to become
frightened" elicited the hand-written note "D violent."
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man;" "she moved out of her house after Elena told her what Ramon did to her and
they have been staying with different family members."
Elena's interview was videotaped. The interviewer's dictation read, in part:
She was wearing a shirt and Bermuda shorts. He pulled down her
Bermuda's then he opened his pants and put his penis in her rectum.
He pulled her panties down when he did that to her. After he did
that he was just normal, as if nothing ever happened and she was
"kind of dumb."
[At the old house] when he did not pull her pants down he would
stand and go up and down with his penis on her rectum but he did
not put it "in, in, in." The worst time was the day they moved be-
cause her mom was not there and he took advantage .... When he
put his penis in her rectum it felt "weird" and "bad." She did not see
his penis but she saw him pull down his pants. His penis felt "kind
of soft" and "nasty." Nothing came out of it and it felt "kind of dry."
Elena said at her old house Ramon did that to her more than 3 times.
He did not pull down her pants, take his pants down or have his pe-
nis out any of those times. She thought that he took his penis out an-
other time but that time he did not stick it "as in." She was at her old
house when he did that. No one saw that happen. I asked her how
many times he actually put his penis in her rectum and she said 2
times. The first time it happened she was around 9 years old. She
was 10 years old the last time it happened when she was moving to
her new house.
Thus, three separate descriptions of Elena's charges were prepared: the detec-
tive' s probable cause statement (the A-Form), the Rape Treatment Center doctor's
form with notations (including the "decreased anal sphincter tone" observation),
and the Children's Center dictation.
A four-count information (three counts of lewd and lascivious assault and one
of capital sexual battery) was filed and a preliminary bail ("Arthur") hearing, twice
postponed, was held before Judge Sosa on February 28, 1995.72 Since defendants
incarcerated at the time of trial are more likely both to be convicted and to be sen-
tenced to incarceration,73 and since defendants facing life in prison without possi-
72 If the charge is Capital Sexual Battery, the sentence is mandatory life without possibility of
parole, and defendants are entitled to bail only under special, Florida-Supreme-Court-created, cir-
cumstances. See State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980), holding that a defendant charged with
a capital offense is entitled to bail unless the State shows evidence of guilt "evident or the pre-
sumption great," a burden of proof more onerous than "beyond a reasonable doubt." All quotations
and facts in the following text come from a transcript of the "Arthur" hearing that is on file with
the University of Minnesota Law Library.73 See generally Richard S. Frase, Defining the Limits of Crime Control and Due Process, The
Limits of Law Enforcement by Hans Zeisel, 73 CAL. L. REv. 212 (1985) (book review).
Vol. 7 No. I
[2005] THE DYNAMICS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTION 79
bility of parole will certainly be interested in a plea bargain for a lighter sentence,74
the stakes in Garcia's Arthur hearing were high. Yet the hearing was short, the
thirty-six page transcript considerably shorter than the subsequent deposition of the
Rape Treatment Center examining doctor. An interpreter was appointed because
Garcia spoke no English. The interpreter and witnesses were sworn and the prose-
cutor invoked the procedural rule requiring sequestration of witnesses. The State's
first and only witness was the investigating detective. A member of the police force
for six years, assigned to sexual crime investigations for sixteen months, he had
investigated some eighty sexual assault complaints. A hearsay objection to ques-
tions about the victim's statements was overruled: "hearsay is admissible for the
purpose of the Arthur hearing." The detective's testimony included the following
statements: When Elena reported the assault to him she was very calm. "At the
beginning she was nervous and then she relaxed and disclosed to me what actually
transpired." Elena "said, 'He put his thing in my rear end,"' correctly explained her
terms as Ramon's penis and her rectum, and "said it stung when he put it inside of
her rectum." Elena also described Ramon' s other assaults and her reasons for fail-
ing to disclose them. Ms. Perez, interviewed through Elena because she spoke only
broken English, disclosed that she was terrified of the defendant. The A-Form was
admitted into evidence. The detective had not attended the Rape Treatment Center
examination, nor had he spoken to the examining physician. The detective had
watched the videotaped Children's Center interview on a monitor. Although Gar-
cia's lawyer75 expressed disappointment that she had not been able to make ar-
rangements to have the interview videotape introduced into the Arthur hearing re-
cord, the Children's Center report was admitted without objection.76 Questioned
about other victim contacts, the detective testified that another officer told him that
Ms. Perez called to express her fear of the defendant; Ms. Perez also told the other
officer "that she had taken the victim to the Rape Treatment Center and she was
examined and evidence was found substantiating her allegations. . . " Ms. Perez
vacated her residence because of fear of the defendant. Finally, Garcia was identi-
fied in the court room.
74 The majority of a randomly selected sample of 1996 Dade County capital sexual battery
charges terminated in pleas to some lesser offense-usually some form of lewd, lascivious, or inde-
cent assault. See supra note 13.
75 Garcia was represented by a public defender who associated with another lawyer fluent in
Spanish. The second lawyer conducted the Arthur hearing; some of the depositions were conducted
by both-before Garcia changed lawyers. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
76 The Children's Center Report, as it appeared in the Unit's case file, included a copy of the
Rape Treatment Center form with the remark about decreased anal sphincter tone that became the
subject of controversy later in the hearing and thereafter. The hearing transcript suggests, see the
cross-examination which follows this note, that the form was introduced into evidence as attached
to the Children's Center Report. Garcia's lawyer cross-examined the detective about the report. See
infra note 77 and accompanying text. Prior to the Arthur hearing, on December 20, 1995, the Rape
Treatment Center examining doctor signed an affidavit that his report had been prepared contem-
poraneously with and as a part of his examination of Elena and the results of his examination were
incorporated into the report. There was no indication that the affidavit was included in the Arthur
hearing record.
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On cross-examination of the detective, the following colloquy occurred:
Q. Now, are you aware that the result of the Rape Treatment-
Center, exhibit A, examination indicates that there were no le-
sions or tears to the rectum?
A. I was made aware that the doctor's examination revealed
evidence corroborating the victim's allegations. 77Q. Evidence corroborating the victim's allegations?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware that there were no lesions found to the
rectum?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware that there were no healed tears or scars to-
the rectum?
A. No.
Q. Were you aware there was no physical injury of any sort
indicating that there had been penetration by an adult to a ten-
year old child?
A. No, I was just informed by the Rape Treatment nurse and
by [the policeman contacted by Ms. Perez] that the Rape
Treatment Center report was-did corroborate the victim's alle-
gations.
Q. Actually, the Rape Treatment Report only-the only thing it
says is that it showed a decreased anal sphincter tone, nothing
else?
A. Right.
Q. And nothing which you would expect to find in a case
where there was actual anal penetration by an adult on a ten-
year old child. Would you expect to find some sort of injuries
or-
A. Well, I am not [a] doctor, so that is not my profession.
Q. Well, in your experience as a sexual battery-
A. Yes.
Q.-detective, would you expect to find some sort of more seri-
ous injuries or visible injuries?
A. As a sexual battery detective we work in connection with
the doctor at the Rape Treatment Center and once they tell us
that a-what they find in their evidence is it corroborates the-
victim's allegations, then that is what I go on. I don't question
the doctor.
Q. Actually you never spoke to the doctor?
A. Absolutely.
Q. You did not?
A. I did not.
Q. Okay.
77 Notice the non-responsive answer. Instead of asking the judge to instruct the witness to an-
swer, defense counsel simply takes note of the nature of the answer and persists.
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Garcia's lawyer asked the detective if he knew that, prior to the allegations, in
her daughter's presence, Estelle had threatened to call the police, if necessary, to
get the defendant out of her life. The prosecutor's relevance objection was over-
ruled: the mother and the daughter might have a motive to fabricate the charge.
The detective denied knowledge of the threat. Nor was the detective aware of "any
problems this family had been having," or of "any incident while they were to-
gether where the police had to be called out there for any allegations of any type of
physical violence or abuse." The State rested.
The defense presented only one witness, Garcia's brother's daughter. She had
known the defendant all her life, and had known Ms. Perez since her uncle began a
relationship with her some five or six years previously. The niece testified that she
heard Ms. Perez say in front of Elena and the witness's mother, "she didn't know
how to get [the defendant] out of her life. Like, she didn't know what to do, she
had to find something to get him out of her life." The judge admitted this testimony
as relevant to Ms. Perez's and Elena's motive. But the judge would not allow tes-
timony about the defendant's non-violent nature. Cross-examination elicited the
fact that the witness had never lived with the defendant and his family and that she
was confused as to the timing of the overheard conversation.
The judge allowed oral argument. The prosecutor stated:
[F]rom the Rape Treatment Center report made by the doctor, in his
affidavit he notes that she had decreased sphincter muscle tone, that
being consistent with anal penetration. From her statement that she
gave to the police officer, and when the victim was interviewed at
the Children's Center, she was able to give details as to when and
how this happened, explained how he was able to put his penis in-
side of her rectum. She was even able to describe how it felt. If, in
fact, she had been making all this up, how would she know how to
describe how it felt, unless, in fact, it happened. And she did feel
this discomfort.
The prosecutor cited the girl's fear for her mother's safety to explain her failure to
disclose earlier.
Garcia's lawyer referred to the couple's marital troubles and Estelle's desire
to be rid of the defendant; but she focused primarily on the absence of physical
evidence:
I believe that the nature of this type of crime, of anal penetration of
an adult to a child, would result in certainly much more evidence of
damage or injury than what the Rape Treatment report indicates. It
says in there that it was-the only thing consistent with it was that
there was a loss of sphincter muscle tone. That could be consistent
with a lot of other things. And it's certainly no evidence of any le-
sions, tears, scars, lacerations, all the types of injuries that you
would expect to find with this type of penetration. As to the State's
argument that she knows how it felt because she described how it
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felt, she basically said that it felt weird and bad. I believe that this
type of penetration, this type of injury would have been very, very
painful. There would have been some evidence of-just pain and
nothing of this was even said, nothing like that has been indicated in
any way.
The judge decided the issue immediately from the bench: the Rape Treatment
Center reported no lesions in the anal area; the record was "basically devoid of any
type of corroborating evidence." Although corroboration is unnecessary for convic-
tion, and at trial the child's hearsay statements might be admissible,78 the standard
for bail hearing purposes is higher. Therefore, "proof is not evident, presumption
not great." Without mentioning the defendant's priors, the judge set bond at
$30,000, conditioned on the defendant's house arrest in his brother's house while
wearing an ankle bracelet and avoiding any contact with any minor-including, of
course, his daughter. Garcia's brother's modest equity in his home was pledged as
security for the bail bond.
In light of the importance to both prosecutor and defense counsel of the out-
come, the hearing's brevity and limited testimony might seem surprising.79 The
proof might have been deemed "evident and the presumption great" had the victim
testified; however well a detective testifies, however disposed a judge may be to
believe police officers, the victim adds verisimilitude to the courtroom drama. Yet
the prosecutor may have feared putting pressure on the victim and undermining her
utility: exposing inconsistencies in her "disclosures," risking unnecessary psycho-
logical harm, and, perhaps, inducing a fear of testifying that might make a plea
agreement harder to obtain. Why the prosecutor failed to introduce Elena's inter-
view tape is more difficult to understand. Garcia's lawyer was sure to be able to
review it eventually; 80 and both the judge and Garcia's lawyer might infer from the
tape's absence that Elena was not a "good" (e.g., credible) witness-that is, a de-
tective's repetitions of her disclosures might be more persuasive than her testi-
mony. On the other hand, the videotape, as well as Garcia's lawyer's need to assess
the victim's credibility, might eventually be a lever to compel a jailed defendant to
plea bargain. 8' The prosecutor might have called the Rape Treatment Center doctor
78 See infra note 95.
79 Experienced trial lawyers and judges would probably not be surprised. In many states, bail
decisions (even in homicide cases) are based on a probation officer's report (as to the likelihood
that the defendant will appear for trial and as to the danger to the community the defendant would
pose if released) and arguments of counsel. Constitutional doctrine in some states requires that bail
be set in every case-but judges can effectively deny pre-trial release by setting a bail amount the
defendant cannot possibly raise. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 59.
80 On discovery in criminal cases generally, see id. at 909-24. The authors report that the
trend in the states "has been in the direction of consistently broadening the reach of defense dis-
covery... "Id. at 914. The Florida rules are found in FLA. R. CRIM. P. § 3.220 (2002). On Decem-
ber 11, 1995, ajudge granted defendant's motion to obtain the videotape for counsel's review. For
some suggestion that discovery by defendant's counsel in practice might not be as liberal as the
formal rules allow, see infra note 81.
81 In a letter found in another Dade County prosecution file, the prosecutor informed the pub-
lic defender that all witnesses and the victim were minors "so remember if you take their deposi-
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to testify about "decreased anal sphincter tone." (The prosecutor would not have
been happy to have the doctor testify if his deposition had been taken prior to the
Arthur hearing.) 82 Without the doctor's testimony, though, the prosecutor was on
shaky ground arguing that the medical observation was "consistent with" forced
anal intercourse: by 1996 many experienced defense counsel were familiar with
and prepared to discount prosecution expert witness testimony (efforts, they be-
lieved, to obfuscate the absence of physical evidence) that a variety of behavioral
symptoms are "consistent with" abuse. 83 Or the prosecutor might have concluded,
based on Judge Sosa's past decisions, that the Arthur issue was a "slam dunk"-
even though most trial lawyers know (and all trial lawyers should know) that even
tions there will no longer be a plea offer. [The victim] was seen at the Children's Center, so there's
a tape available. This might assist you, if you are interested in a plea." Dade County criminal law-
yers report that this memorandum conveyed standard Unit policy. The official justification for the
policy is that testifying is a traumatic event for children and if defense counsel is prepared to re-
quire the trauma, even by way of deposition, the Unit might as well go through with a trial. Of
course, this policy undermines Florida's criminal prosecution discovery policies, see supra note
80, and imposes an enormous burden on a defendant in a marginal prosecution because his lawyer
will have no satisfactory basis for predicting how effective a witness the victim will be. For evi-
dence that the policy was followed in other judicial districts as well, see State v. Gibson, Transcript
of Hearing on Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, June 9, 2000, p. 196 (on file with the author).
Defense lawyers report that the Unit policy, although announced in most cases, was not always fol-
lowed. Apparently, defense counsel were allowed to view any videotape of interviews of victims
by the prosecutor without fear of subjecting their clients to a trial.
82 See infra note 88 and subsequent text.
83 In many prosecutions during the 1980s, experts cited long laundry lists of behavioral symp-
toms-sometimes massed and described as an abused child syndrome to conclude that the victim's
behavior was consistent with the syndrome. A notorious example was criticized in Steward v.
State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. 1995), where an expert witness testified: "[K]ids who have
known incidents of sexual abuse exhibit certain traits or characteristics or behavior pattern." An
expert should look for the following types of behavior in the "characterization of sexual abuse:
[a]nything for medical reasons, from bladder infections to abnormal medical problems,
and more of the characteristics, the girls can be anything from promiscuous, they can be
very timid, they can come in with very low esteem. Almost exclusively, that is going to
be a major characteristic. Some of the different cues can range in areas from being
really over timid to different kinds of touches and approaches, where you would ap-
proach them in different directions or from different manners or methods. You might
even put your hand on their shoulder and that might freak them out or something.
The defendant's conviction was affirmed. The Supreme Court of Florida put the quietus on this form
of testimony in Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1997). See also Rosalyn Schultz, Better
Lawyering: Tips for Attorneys, Evaluating Mental Health Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases,
17 ABA CHILD L. PRACTICE 1,6 (March 1998): "There is no syndrome or psychological profile to
differentiate sexually abused from nonabused children."
The "consistent with" technique was not discovered by child sexual abuse experts. See Faust
Rossi, Sacco and Vanzetti: Martyrs or Murderers?, CORNELL LAW ALUMNI BuLLETIN 7, 12-13
(July 2000) (police expert studied ballistics of defendant's gun in infamous 1920s murder case and
told prosecutor that fatal bullet probably did not come from gun carried by either defendant; report
not turned over to defense counsel; prosecutor arranged to have expert testify that the ballistics
evidence "is consistent with being fired by [Sacco's] pistol"-a statement literally correct but
meaningless. Apparently the prosecutor got away with this ruse-and Sacco and Vanzetti were
convicted and eventually executed.)
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in court trials there are no "slam dunks."84
Garcia's lawyers, on the other hand, had a dilemma. Obviously, it was dan-
gerous to rely only on cross-examination and oral argument to raise doubts about
the victim's lack of physical injury; but they had not yet examined the Rape
Treatment Center doctor, and they would not want to allow opportunities to re-
hearse explanations for the lack of physical evidence.85 Yet, just as the prosecutor's
"consistent with" endeavor was questionable without testimony about decreased
anal sphincter tone, defense counsel's argument about observable physical injury
could also have been summarily rejected. Moreover, defense counsel failed to
make the most of holes in the victim's story. Elena's odd description of the details
of the rape-that it felt "weird and bad"-and her failure to describe the attack as
painful were barely mentioned; Elena's references to Ramon's penis ("kind of
soft" and "kind of dry"), phrases whose descriptive inadequacy could have cast
doubt on her credibility, were ignored. Garcia's lawyers' failure to review the
videotape prior to the hearing (or to object to testimony about Elena's disclosures
until the videotape was reviewed) was difficult to explain, unless a demand for the
videotape entailed untoward strategic consequences.86 But defense counsel's re-
sponsibility was only to create some doubt for the fact-finder, less doubt than a
"reasonable doubt." Perhaps, given time and other constraints, argument may have
appeared to be (as it turned out to be in fact) sufficient to obtain Garcia's release
on bond. Despite the caveats, the hearing transcript shows: (1) busy lawyers,
prosecutors and defense counsel alike, do not always have or do not take the time
to prepare fully for trials and hearings;87 (2) hindsight by trial critics is always eas-
ier than the decisions trial lawyers make under the tense conditions of adversarial
contest.
The defendant's release from jail appeared to slow the pace of the prosecu-
tion. The next event recorded was Estelle Perez's deposition, conducted by both of
Garcia's lawyers through an interpreter on May 16, 1995, ten weeks after the A r-
84 The prosecutor's decision to rely for "proof evident" in this case only on the investigating
detective's testimony was especially surprising since at least some professional staff members of
the Unit believed judges to be biased against prosecutors in sex cases. Consider the attitudes of two
Unit staff members. After preliminary hearings in a sexual battery case heard by two different
judges, the prosecutor commented to the author about the competence of one of the judges: "Oh,
yes, Judge 'A,' he's terrible, he takes the ACLU position in every case; in fact, they don't let him
handle Arthur hearings any more." See supra note 72. On another occasion a staff lawyer com-
plained to the author that judges generally, and especially Judge "B," are biased against prosecu-
tors. Judge "B," who had that afternoon presided at the conviction of a defendant of capital sexual
battery, "decided all the evidence issues against us. He's a liberal!" It is dangerous to draw infer-
ences about prosecutorial decision-making from casual characterizations; but casual remarks do
suggest mind sets consistent with scholarly studies of prosecutors' personalities and politics. See
generally, PHiuP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 183 (1988).85 See infra note 115-20 and accompanying text for an examination of the medical, doctrinal
and tactical issues raised by the sphincter tone testimony.86 See supra note 81.
87 A pro forma memorandum from the Chief Assistant of the Criminal Division, notified the
prosecutor that an Arthur hearing had been scheduled and asked the prosecutor to inform the As-
sistant if she did not "expect to be ready by the assigned date." See supra note 69.
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thur hearing. This deposition disclosed the following facts: Ms. Perez lived with
Garcia for some time in 1989; she received some, but very little, child support
from her previous husband; she never went to court or made any effort to prevent
her husband from seeing his children; Ramon had "a very normal relationship"
with her daughters; he never argued with the victim but he got along "very badly"
with her younger sister; Ramon never physically assaulted the victim or her; they
had "normal arguments, but very heavy, he would not hit me but he would push
me, and shake me;" Ramon originally had helped pay for the rent and groceries but
stopped before the incidents leading to his arrest. Ms. Perez admitted that some
months after Garcia's child was born she "broke up" with him and wanted him out
of her home, and that she communicated this information to a number of members
of her family and to her friends, including Ramon's brother's wife. She also ac-
knowledged that on several occasions she threatened to call the police to remove
Ramon from the house; she claimed that these threats were all occasioned by ar-
guments with Ramon during which he threatened her physically. Much of the
lengthy deposition (94 transcript pages) concerned Ramon's lawyers' effort to set
up impeachment opportunities for Estelle's trial testimony. She was closely ques-
tioned as to when she first became the recipient of welfare benefits (in 1991),
whether and to what extent Ramon provided help with rental payments and support
for her and for his child and/or for the family (only occasionally), why she commit-
ted welfare fraud by failing to tell welfare authorities that Ramon was living with
her and providing support (because he threatened to kill her if she told), and
whether and why, if she was so afraid of him, she was willing to leave the girls
with Ramon alone (only on the street rather than at home) and to have him pick up
her daughters at school (only occasionally).
The deposition of the Rape Treatment Center's doctor was taken on June 7,
1995 and transcribed in October. 88 Dr. Alejandro Gomez, a Jackson Hospital resi-
dent in Obstetrics and Gynecology, had moonlighted at the Center for two years.
Dr. Gomez obtained his medical degree in 1976 in Bogota, Columbia, his home
town. Before his move to the United States in 1985, he did "sex education" re-
search and prepared a thesis on the need for pediatricians to obtain more training in
how to interview molested children. For three years after immigrating, Gomez
taught "medical subjects at the college level," at the Miami Institute of Technology
"in those places in which they inform people for ambulances" (apparently fire res-
cue students). It quickly appeared that Gomez's testimony might easily be im-
peached if he were called to testify as an expert:
Q. During that time, you did not practice, because you hadn't-you
had to study for the boards?
A. Yes, study for the boards.
Q. And when did you, finally, do that?
"
8The transcript which follows and all the information about Dr. Gomez's background
and career reported here are taken from the deposition, which was found in the Garcia file.
See supra note 69.
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A. I passed my first one in '90-my second one in '91, and my third
one in '91.
Q. When you say the first one, and the second one, my father is a
doctor, I don't remember what they were; what is the first set?
A. The first is the basic component, the second is what they call the
medical clinical component, and the third one is integrated of every-
thing, it was called at the time the Flex, it has changed, it is, now,
less parts; part one, part two, and part three always harder.
Q. Over how many years you had to do this?
A. Over four years.
Q. With studying?
A. Failing and studying, failing, and studying, and I passed.
Q. How many times did you fail?
A. Six or seven.
Q. Did you have a problem with the language?
A. It was a problem at the beginning, it is a big problem, now.
Q. Did you speak English before you got here?
A. No, never.
Dr. Gomez passed the "basic tests" (apparently tests allowing him to practice
medicine in the United States) in 1990, and, in 1993, applied for a four year resi-
dency in Obstetrics-Gynecology, since he no longer wanted to be a pediatrician; at
the time of his deposition, Dr. Gomez still had two more years of residency to
complete. He had received two months of training at the Rape Treatment Center
before beginning to interview victims. His Center work was not supervised despite
his status as a resident, but his responsibilities at the Center are "similar to what I
was trained to do" in Columbia. He always interviewed victims alone and his re-
port was prepared while he interviewed the victim. Asked whether he remembered
Elena, Doctor Gomez answered, "some things, yes." "For example, I could clarify
that when I put digital, it wasn't digital, it was his hands who touched her vagina,
without finger penetration; that is not placed in the history, but I remember, ex-
actly, that." But he did not remember Elena's face. Typical interview length "de-
pends," some children cooperate and others do not, some adults "answer your
questions, so depends, but in general 30 minutes, in general." Less time is taken
with children: "most of the children as patients that have been sexually abused two
months ago, one year ago, so we just need to ask the questions, and to do a quick
physical examination." (Later in the deposition Dr. Gomez stated that his interview
of Elena lasted fifteen minutes.) Asked to describe his manner of asking questions,
he responded, "Why were you brought here? And so on." "Children of this age
usually know why." "I usually do some other questions that, usually, don't have
nothing to do with this. In order to relax, specially with children, my next direct
question is, has somebody been touching you in your private parts, in your but-
tocks? Has somebody been kissing you, a person who really doesn't need to do it,
and usually, when they are four, five, or more, despite they don't know why some-
body brought them there, they tell me." Dr. Gomez remembered none of the actual
words Elena used other than what he had written on the form. This colloquy fol-
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lowed:
A. Then I asked her less than 20, less than ten, less than fifteen, I
think that is important for medical, and psychological reasons, it is
important to know if it has been three times or three years in a row.
Q. Why would that be important?
A. Because one of the examinations that we do is to confirm the
anal sphincter tone. In this case, the anal sphincter tone is main-
tained, if the patient has had one or two episodes of penetration a
long time ago, but if the patient has been penetrated several or many
times, and the time from the last it is not too long, we can find a de-
creased anal sphincter tone, so it is important to know how many
times, and when was the last time.
Q. And based upon what she said, that the last time it occurred was
in November, it was three times, and less than ten times; that was-
A. Is that possible to find decreased anal sphincter tone? Yes, not
always, I don't know if voluntary-
Q. Go ahead.
A. Not only a decreased anal sphincter tone by sexual abuse, an-
other physical problem can produce that.
Q. Such as, what?
A. Diarrhea, extreme nervousness, that's why some people defecate,
and urinate in front of fear.
Q. Anything else?
A. Those are the most frequent....
Q. And based upon her answers [to your questions], you concluded
that it was the situation, where there was penetration?
A. Well, verbally, yes, verbally, yes.
Q. What about physically?
A. Physically, what I found was the decrease anal sphincter tone.
Q. Well, would that-
A. Its related with the possibility of anal penetration.
Q. With the possibility?
A. Well, yes.
Q. What else would you expect to find in a situation where there
was actual penetration?
A. We never, never can say it was an actual penetration.
Q. You can't?
A. No, we were not there, at that time.
Dr. Gomez was not concerned about the lack of physical evidence of anal rape:
Q.... fresh tears, old tears, scars, you know, active bleeding, or no
bleeding, is there anything like that, that you would find, where
there has been actual penetration of a ten year old by a fifty years
old man anal?
A. No, nothing specific.
Q. I mean, there won't be any tears?
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A. No, I couldn't find any lesion.
Q. Did you expect to find any?
A. Sometimes you have lesions that'give us a clue to sexual abuse;
for example, venereal disease, certain venereal diseases cannot be
transmitted, except by genital contact.
Q .... would you expect to find any type of scars or tears or any kind
of injuries, physical?
A.... peri-anal area heals very quickly, in 1, 2, 3 days you cannot
find anything.
Q. Any evidence whatsoever?
A. Probably, for me, as a physician, if it is just that area of our body,
that heals quickly.
Q. If it was something that had just occurred, you would have ex-
pect to have some lesions, tears, lacerations?
A. No, not two months ago.
Q. Not if it just occurred yesterday, and they went to see you today?
A. Yes, sometimes, not always.
Q. The extent of injury, would it depend on the size of the child and
the adult?
A. Yes.
Despite this last admission, Dr. Gomez's answers were equivocal, arguably incon-
sistent, and confused:
Q. Would you expect to find, if it is something that just occurred,
would you expect any bleeding?
A. After two months, no.
Q. If it was fresh, right away, would you expect to find bleeding?
A. Yes, once again, it depends on the offender, if he is an adult, is a
boy, depends on the victim. If it is an adult or a boy, and depends on
the act.
Q. In this situation, the girl being 10 years old, and this being a man,
you are saying it doesn't surprise you that, even if there was full
penetration, that there would be no physical signs of it, other than
the loss of anal sphincter tone?
A. No, because the patient have had this kind of activity before,
several times, the last time probably, consented, he was not violent,
she was not trying to go away.
Q. Did you ask her about that?
A. No, I don't ask.
Q. She was threatened verbally. Do you know if there was any
physical force or violence involved?
A. No, she denied that. He restrained her. Usually, that doesn't hap-
pened with the children. The children develop what has been called
child-specially, in these children, what has been called child's sex-
ual abuse accommodation abuse, which is, the children they first
keep things like a secret, then they are ashamed that this happened,
they feel guilty, and they accommodate and rationalize, this hap-
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pened, this is the guy who pays the bill, he is the friend of my
mother, and all those things. 89
Dr. Gomez acknowledged that he had not asked Elena specifically whether she
meant "penetration" when she used the words "put his penis in my rectum;" but he
was satisfied that there had been penetration. He did not remember whether he had
asked Elena if the assault hurt. As to resistance, Elena said, "I tried to move." Go-
mez related the explanation he used to elicit Elena's denial of ejaculation: "when
the man has been moving, sometimes they expel, they put out a fluid, like a milk,
that is sticky, probably she knew from before." If Elena indicated that ejaculation
occurred on prior occasions he should have reported the information on the form,
"but I didn't." Again on the subject of decreased anal sphincter tone:
Q. How did you determine that?
A. It is a subjective-it is a subjective test. We know what is the
pressure of the anal sphincter tone. One of our regular examination
is to do a rectal examination. We know more or less how much reac-
tivity stands the anal sphincter tone has. When the anal has been
penetrated many times in sexual abuse or sexual relationships, the
sphincter loses its tone, so the entrance of the finger is more easy.
Q. Is that-can you quantify that in any way?
A. No.
Q. Is there any way to measure it?
A. No.
Q. Is that a situation where it is a really bad anal sphincter tone, as
opposed to just a little bit looser than normal?
A. Well, in many occasions, when the abuse has been chronical, and
has been up to recent time, but most important, chronic, we don't
need to put the finger, you can see the whole.
Q. So there are varying degrees?
A. Yes. I can say mild decrease of anal sphincter tone, probably, it
was not severely decreased. If I find something like that, I put it. But
when it is clearly anal sphincter tone, you just put severe anal
sphincter tone.
Q. When do you put severe?
A. When just recently had had anal sex or when for a long time they
have had anal sex. It was not normal for sure, it was not severe for
89 Dr. Gomez conflated two concepts familiar to and often used by prosecution expert wit-
nesses in child sexual abuse cases. The first, the "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,"
is a heuristic collection of symptoms often used to explain failures initially to report or recantations
of abuse allegations during legal proceedings. See Roland Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Ac-
commodation Syndrome, 7 CHiLD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983). The syndrome entailed enough
logical difficulties to persuade some appellate courts to hold "Summit-Accommodation-Syndrome"
testimony inadmissible. See Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony to Prove Child Sexual
Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 383, 393-94 (1989). Dr. Gomez may have been referring to a so-called "child
sexual abuse syndrome," testimony that after the Garcia case the Florida Supreme Court ruled in-
admissible. See Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 578-79 (Fla. 1997). See also supra note 53.
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sure; severe for me is just to see an opening in the anus, I don't need
to place a finger, because it is opened already.
Q. But when you do the examination, can you distinguish between
less and more anal sphincter tone?
A. Yes....
Q. And you said earlier, this can be due to other situations, such as
diarrheas or nervousness?
A. Yes, extremely anxiety.
Q. Would being 10 years old and being examined at the Rape
Treatment Center be a situation where you would expect somebody
to be nervous?
A. Yes, I was talking to her about that, when I find that the patient is
very anxious, I put it, because I know that affect.
Q. The tone?
A. The reliability of the sphincter tone.
After Dr. Gomez added that pregnancy might also relax the sphincter, the deposi-
tion continued:
Q. Based on your interview, do you reach a conclusion, as to
whether or not there is, or there has been or there is evidence of
abuse?
A. Well, because the only complain, I am not saying that this child
is not lying, that is my concept, my personal concept.
Q. No, because you are saying-
A. This child talks about just that fact, that specific sexual relation-
ship, and that's it.
Q. But do you question them about other areas, to find out their
level of knowledge of their, you know, possibly, showing signs of
problems or things in other areas?
A. No, usually, they-
Q. Reveal themselves?
A. They reveal themselves in other ways.
Q. Such as what?
A. The way in which they talk about sex....
Q. For example, if the child is very shy, isn't willing to take off their
clothes, what would that indicate?
A. That can indicate many things. Shame, because of all the things
that have been happening. A very conservative education from the
parents.
Q. It can indicate exposure to sexual activity or lack of knowledge
from the parents, either way, it can be interpreted?
A. I cannot tell you fever is a cold, if you tell me fever and headache
is a cold, I cannot tell you that fever and headache, and pain in the
throat, I cannot tell you that.... It is the whole thing. It is the way
in which they behave, the way they talk, the words they use, how
ashamed they are, how much support they need from the parents, the
adults. My finding is my physical examination, the answers to my
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questions, the answer to the same question placed in different ways,
it is not easy.
Dr. Gomez denied that sexual abuse diagnosis is an art and admitted that he was
not trained in psychology, but he had "read some." Asked whether he had ever
made a negative finding where the only evidence was decreased anal sphincter
tone, Gomez responded, "No." Given another chance to "conceive of a situation"
like Elena's in which abuse might not have occurred, Dr. Gomez responded:
Yes. For example, we have a woman that was paraplegic disabled,
and I found decreased anal sphincter tone, and she reports the his-
tory of sexual abuse, you can conclude the decreased anal sphincter
tone, because of the sexual abuse, but, also, because the lack of in-
nervation [sic] that she had in her medulla, so in that case, I cannot
say this decreased sphincter tone is because of the sexual abuse....
If I don't see the person very nervous or a clear history of tear or di-
arrhea or chronic diarrhea or paraplegic, that was another cause,
yes, I concluded that was abuse.
On that note, the deposition ended. 90
Six months later, in December, just as Garcia was changing lawyers, the
prosecutor prepared a motion for an "in limine" ("at the threshold"-in effect, be-
fore the matter arises) order authorizing the Rape Treatment Center report's admis-
sibility at trial without Dr. Gomez' s testimony. The motion asserted that the report
was either a business record or a public record, both of which are treated as excep-
tions to Florida's hearsay exclusion rule. The motion also sought permission for
the medical director of the Center to testify "from such report and render an appro-
priate opinion." Dr. Gomez had to be replaced, the motion stated, because he was
no longer a Center employee. The motion rehearsed the pertinent evidentiary rules
and contended that the substitution would not violate the defendant's Constitu-
tional Confrontation rights.9 1
90 Readers unfamiliar with trial and deposition transcripts may be surprised to discover so
many misunderstandings between counsel and witness, repetitions of inquiries, as well as non se-
quiturs. This transcript is not atypical. Nor is it unusual for a deponent's counsel, unhappy with the
path the deposition seems to be taking, to seek to disrupt that path with some evidentiary objection
either to alert the witness to danger or to throw the questioner off stride. Counsel could instruct the
deponent not to answer a question; in such a case, the deposing lawyer could ask the judge to order
the answer. Judicial interventions are inconvenient and unusual: depositions are usually taken in
counsel's office, trips to the courthouse are not welcomed by lawyers, and judges do not like to be
bothered.
91 The copy of this motion in the Unit's file was hand-marked "deferred 12/11/95," the very
date on which the trial judge ordered that Garcia's lawyer be provided a copy of the victim's Chil-
dren Center videotaped statement. Whether the two events were connected in some fashion is un-
known. The file documents indicate that a hearing on the State's motion to substitute was sched-
uled for March 14, 1996 but contain no information as to the result. The substitution motion was
apparently filed with a group of "boiler plate" motions used whenever the prosecutor believes the
case is headed for trial. See infra note 100-03 and accompanying text.
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The prosecutor's effort to replace Dr. Gomez made sense. Based on his depo-
sition performance, it was unlikely that Dr. Gomez's testimony at trial might have
been helpful and it might have hurt the State's case. Dr. Gomez's difficulty with
English might not have harmed his credibility. But he had very serious disabilities:
his failures to pass American medical boards; his switch in careers and lack of
American training in the field about which he would have been testifying; 92 the
briefness of his examination of Elena and failure to ask her pertinent and important
questions; his inability to quantify or objectify his physical findings in any fashion;
the relationship of varying levels of sphincter tone to the likelihood that anal rape
had occurred; his confusion of concepts familiar to child sexual abuse experts;93
and the common sense intuition many jurors might have (the same intuition the
92 Dr. Gomez's pediatrics "trade union card," even from a foreign medical school, would
probably have given him more protection from cross-examination than would a residency in Ob-
Gyn. Obstetricians are not commonly experts on anal sphincter tone, especially the tone of a child
claiming that she was anally raped.
93 At trial, a good defense lawyer would cross-examine Dr. Gomez as to his understanding of
concepts such as the "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome." See supra note 89. But
such "red herring" theories were successfully used for a long time by prosecution expert witnesses
and accepted by appellate courts affirming convictions; thus, many defense lawyers might not take
advantage of Dr. Gomez's confusion to impeach him. See Levy, supra note 2; Fannin v. State, 645
So. 2d 1082 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (counsel not inneffective despite failure to object to expert's
"pedophile profile" testimony because, at the time of trial, the Florida Supreme Court had not yet
declared such testimony inadmissible). Whether the Confrontation Clause of the United States
Constitution's Sixth Amendment might deny consideration of Dr. Gomez's report as evidence
without his accompanying testimony presents a somewhat murky evidentiary and Constitutional
issue. Cf Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1985) (not unconstitutional to allow expert
to testify as to removal of hairs from murder weapon even though expert could not remember
which of three possible grounds was basis for his conclusion). Of course, the problem is more dif-
ficult when the defendant cannot cross-examine the expert at all as to the basis for the expert's
conclusion. The prosecutor's brief claimed that "numerous decisions support the admission of ex-
pert reports through a substitute examiner as an exception to the hearsay rule and consistent with
the defendant's constitutional rights. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990); ... Capehart
v. State, 583 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1991)." See supra note 69. Confrontation Clause concerns would
have been minimized because defense counsel was able to cross-examine Dr. Gomez in deposition.
The substitute expert proposed by the prosecutor would give an opinion as to whether Elena had
been raped based on the factual findings in Dr. Gomez's report-and the report would be admissi-
ble as the basis for the substitute expert's opinion. The defendant's lawyer could then rebut the tes-
timony by cross-examining the substitute expert witness as to the basis for her conclusion-asking,
for example, whether anal rape can be inferred from decreased anal sphincter tone or if it is reason-
able to rely on a medical examiner with Dr. Gomez's record and accomplishments. (The cross-
examination might proceed along these lines: "Doctor, would you be willing to rely on a finding of
decreased tone if you knew the finding was made by a person with no medical training? By a per-
son who had flunked out of medical school? By a person with a foreign medical degree who had
flunked American medical boards seven times?") Procedure experts say that defense counsel could
use Dr. Gomez's deposition to cross-examine the substitute about her reliance on Dr. Gomez's ex-
amination findings. The defendant's lawyer could also present a medical expert either to dispute
the inference of anal rape from decreased anal sphincter tone or to dispute the accuracy of Doctor
Gomez's findings. Such cross-examination might well severely damage both Dr. Gomez's report as
well as his credibility-but ajury might believe it anyway! On confrontation issues, see generally
LAFAVE, supra note 59, at § 24.3.
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Arthur hearing judge apparently had) that anal rape of a ten-year-old girl by a ma-
ture adult would have physical consequences graver than decreased anal sphincter
tone. In July, Garcia's lawyer took the victim's deposition. 94 Cross-examining a
child is always difficult. The child's statements concerning the events are admissi-
ble at trial, along with other hearsay statements, if they are found to be reliable and
the child is "unavailable."
95
Elena's deposition contained few surprises.96 Elena gave her age, the schools
she had attended, and the addresses of homes she had lived in with her mother and
94 Garcia's lawyer told the author that he knew about the Unit rule about victim depositions,
supra note 8 1, but could not remember whether he had received a warning when the deposition
was scheduled.
95 The Florida legislature followed a national trend in making special provision for the admis-
sibility at trial of out of court statements of abused children which would otherwise be deemed in-
admissible hearsay. The route chosen in Florida was to amend its version of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 807, the so-called general hearsay exception, to make such statements admissible under spe-
cial circumstances. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West 1999). The statute authorizes the ad-
missibility of an "out-of-court statement made by a child victim with a physical, mental, emotional,
or developmental age of 11 or less describing any act of child abuse or neglect, any act of sexual
abuse against a child, the offense of child abuse .... or any offense involving an unlawful sexual
act.... unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by which the statement is
reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness ..." Id. The trial judge must find "in a hearing con-
ducted outside the presence of the jury" (1) "that the time, content, and circumstances of the state-
ment provide sufficient safeguards of reliability," and (2) the child testifies or the child is "unavail-
able as a witness" and there is "other corroborative evidence of the abuse or offense." Id. The leg-
islature specified that "unavailability" includes a finding that testifying at the trial would result in a
"substantial likelihood of severe emotional or mental harm" to the child. See Perez v. State, 536
So. 2d 206, 210 (Fla. 1988). The United States Supreme Court has held that statutes like Florida's
do not violate the Confrontation Clause. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). See gener-
ally Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis
or Treatment, 67 N.C.L. REv. 257 (1989); Lynne Celander DeSarbo,, The Danger of Value-Laden
Investigations in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Are Defendants' Constitutional Rights Violated When
Mental Health Professionals Offer Testimony Based on Children's Hearsay Statements and Be-
haviors?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 276 (1999). The Florida Supreme Court has upheld the Florida
statute. State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1994). The Florida appellate decisions have been
sympathetic to the goals of the statute and have interpreted its terms broadly, while insisting that
trial judges (who seem to have had difficulty with the statute's procedural requirements) adhere
strictly to its terms. See, e.g., id. (an incompetent witness is "unavailable" within the meaning of
the statute). See also Pinder v. State, 604 So. 2d 848, 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (child's hear-
say statements should not have been admitted because prosecutor did not inform defendant that
child had recanted critical portion of statement); Allison v. State, 661 So. 2d 889, 892 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (although child may have been victimized by observation of assault against another
child, statement inadmissible because not by a "victim" within meaning of hearsay statute); Spoerri
v. State, 561 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (hearsay statements inadmissible because
trial judge failed to make findings required by statute); Moore v. State, 658 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (hearsay statement inadmissible where trial judge's findings simply mirrored
statutory language rather than making case specific findings); Feller v. State, 637 So. 2d 911 (Fla.
1994) (child's hearsay statements inadmissible despite trial judge's finding that statements were
reliable because judge did not indicate what circumstances relied on but instead indicated that con-
clusion was based on "personal experience" and intuition).
96 Elena's deposition can be found in the documents on file with the University of Minnesota
Law Library. See supra note 69.
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two sisters. Garcia's attorney tried unsuccessfully to have Elena say that she had
been prepared for the deposition by either her mother or the prosecutor; she admit-
ted that the defendant was her mother's boyfriend, immediately retracted the
statement since "I don't know because I never asked my mother," and finally ac-
knowledged that her mother and Ramon "had a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship."
She reported that her mother and the defendant fought often and in every argument
"he would scream, throw things, break doors;" the arguments frightened her and
her sisters and "they would get in the closet, and start crying." Asked if the defen-
dant ever threatened her mother, Elena answered, "He didn't do it, he said, that he
was going to kill her, that he was going to make her disappear." She acknowledged
that she did not like the defendant when he and her mother were fighting; but she
had liked him when the defendant was sleeping in the same room with her mother.
The defendant never hit her or her sisters-and he loved his daughter very much,
more than he loved Elena and her younger sister. Elena never told her mother she
wanted the defendant to leave the house, but her sister did so "all the time." Her
mother also wanted Ramon out of the house, even before Elena told her what
Ramon did; Ramon wanted to be with his daughter and that is what they argued
about. Pursuing the impeachment effort begun with Ms. Perez, Garcia's attorney
asked Elena whether Garcia helped to support the family; Elena denied that he
helped financially. Asked how she knew that Ramon gave her mother no money,
Elena answered:
Because she would tell me that, I would ask her, mom, how did you
get-and because I asked her the same question, how did you get
the money, and she would tell me that's none of my business, that I
am not supposed to know, and then I asked her, well, then, because I
wouldn't ask her, like can I-like-because I was like real scared
that one day, like she didn't have money to pay, and then she told
me not to worry that we were going to have it, and I didn't ask her
anything else.
Elena's deposition did raise some flags for Garcia's lawyers-although the is-
sues were ephemeral and might not have been useful at trial. Elena testified that
the assault "hurt," although she didn't scream "because when I was scared, my
voice didn't come out. . ." Elena claimed that although she did not bleed after the
attack,
but two days, three days later, I had, I bleeded, but my mom thought
it was my period, but it wasn't it, she wasn't sure, so she asked my
grandma, the one that's here, she called her and my grandma said
she wasn't sure that I might be, if it was a lot, it might be it, but it
wasn't, it was not as much as your period.
Elena acknowledged that she had been taken to a doctor who had given her a
physical examination; the doctor "told me to come back up the next day to see if it
was my period, then I didn't have it, he said, that he didn't know what it was, the
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period is supposed to last three days, and that didn't." Estelle had mentioned the
same events in her deposition-but she testified that the doctor had diagnosed the
condition as an occasional menstrual event, uncommon, but not unheard of, among
girls Elena's age, and unlikely to reoccur.
Elena's answers raised other issues as well. She testified that she asked Garcia
for a book bag "after everything had happened," and it was then that he "told me to
convince him" before agreeing to the purchase. Related in this fashion, the book
bag purchase looks less like either payment for an assault or a bribe for secrecy
than it does as it was related to the investigating detective. Then there was Elena's
memory of "the second time he did it to me." Her answer was unresponsive and
rambling:
When I was with my mom, she was sleeping upstairs, and I came
downstairs, and then-well, I was sitting down, and then I was
thinking, because then after when I saw him--well-hold on-when
I got there, I sat down, I was watching T.V., then that same day,
when I went to-okay, my mom woke up like an hour after, and he
hadn't done anything to me, and then after my mom woke up, and
she said she had to go out, she was going to leave me, she was going
to leave my baby sister there, because she had to go to the super-
market, but then every time that she would go out and my baby sis-
ter would stay with him, he would tell me to stay, just in case my
baby sister woke up.
Q. Your baby sister, being Sara?
A. Sara.... And when she-when I was in school, and my mom
was-and my mom left to go somewhere, and she left Sara there,
there I couldn't stay, my mom would tell me then to stay, and so I
would stay. Then I was cleaning up the fish tank outside, when we
came back in, I took a bath, I put on my clothes-no, my sister,
when we finished, my sister and my mom were already here, then
my baby sister, and him were playing-okay in my room, where the
toys were, so then, I went to get my clothes, so that I could take my
bath, my sister wasn't there, my mom wasn't there, they were down-
stairs, my mom was cooking and my sister was helping her....
A. He doesn't take off his clothes or anything, because my baby sis-
ter was there, so then he comes up, and he doesn't take off his
clothes he like pushes himself like up to me, right? And then I was
trying to move; every time he would do that, I would move, because
I think what happened when he was going to put his hand, I called
my sister, I go, J. ,so she could come up, and he goes, oh, now
comes the other one.97
97 Are these the typically incoherent but persuasive phrases a child would use if traumatized
by a crime as well as by the requirement that she relive it? Or are they the infantile non sequiturs of
an untrustworthy child, the carefully planned if idiosyncratic meanderings of a clever liar (who had
previously given a perfectly lucid and organized description of all the events associated with the
alleged anal rape)?
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A portentous event for Garcia's criminal case also occurred in December, on the very
day Elena's videotaped Children's Center interview was released. For reasons unknown to
his lawyers, Garcia fired them and paid $5,000 to a new lawyer. 98 Garcia hired Mr. Gra-
ham "after meeting [him] at the courthouse," because Graham "told him that he would be
able to convince the court to modify Garcia's bond and he would no longer have to wear
[an electronic] monitoring device." "Graham entered his appearance.., on December 19,
1995" and "as promised, filed a motion to modify bond;" but the trial judge "denied the
motion and Garcia continued to wear the monitoring device." 99 In March, 1996, Garcia
sent two letters to Graham concerning his defense. The first provided a list "of all people
that can verify my character and testify on my behalf." Typed in English, the letter de-
scribes the testimony each prospective witness could provide:
1. .He can verify that I was living permanently with the two
little girls and their mother. This contradicts the statement that I was
only a friend of their mother and did not live with them. PS. This
man lives directly across the street from where we lived together for
two years.
2. . She was raised by me as her stepfather for 19 years
since she was 19 months old. She testifies that I never touched her
or insinuated anything abnormal to her.
3. .She was raised by me as her stepfather [in the Domini-
can Republic] for 19 years since she was 06 months old. She testi-
fies that I never touched her or insinuated anything abnormal about
her. She can verify that on March 5, '95 she went to visit her half
sister and Estelle had a man already living with her, less than one
month. My daughter was told that her father is dead.
4. . She is willing to testify that Estelle was so disgusted
with me that she was about to tell the little girl to stab me at night
that nothing would happen to her. This was said a month prior to her
accusation.
5. _ [a Reverend]. Friend of Elena that knew the little girls
and went to his church. He was also a neighbor who knew that we
lived together for two years. At first he believed that I did it but af-
ter talking to me was convinced otherwise.
6. _ [the Arthur hearing witness] and I have lived very closely
98 The file contained two receipts for $2,500 each signed by the new lawyer's secretary. One
of them was dated "12/17/1996," but the later year must have been a misprint. See supra note 69.
99 The quotations and those that follow in the text are taken from a third lawyer's Motion for
Post-Conviction Relief, dated December 5, 1997, ten months after Garcia pled guilty. The motion
was accompanied by a variety of documents described in the text following this note. In April,
1995, responding to a motion made by his first lawyers, a judge at "special term" had modified the
house arrest provision of Garcia's bail conditions to authorize him to leave the house at set times
(approved in advance each week by the "House Arrest Officer") "for the purpose of procuring em-
ployment and/or earning his living." See supra note 69.
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for many years since she was a little girl. She is my niece and never
was anything strange ever suggested.
The second letter, enclosing a tape, read as follows:
Enclosed is a tape of Estelle talking to her ex-husband threatening
him with not seeing the girls if he did not give her money.
The cassette is about 7 years old. She taped them with the possibil-
ity of using them against him in court and in sending him to jail like
she promises in the tape.
Even my voice is heard telling Estelle that Elena was too young to
be saying so many lies.
I found it among my belongings.
I am sending it to you if you think it might be important.
In the second conversation with her niece she talks about him not
seeing the girls ever again!
On March 16, 1996, the date on which the motion to substitute for Doctor
Gomez was filed, the prosecutor filed a number of motions "in limine" requesting
orders: 100 precluding reference to any "specific instance of prior consensual sexual
activity between the victim and any person other than the defendant" and prohibit-
ing "reputation evidence relating to the victim's prior sexual conduct" or evidence
"pertaining to the victim's manner of dress at the time of the sexual assault;"'' 1
"precluding reference to the possible sentence that may be imposed upon convic-
tion;" 10 2 precluding "reference to defendant's lack of prior convictions;"'103 and,
most importantly, announcing the State's intention to rely upon the victim's hear-
say statements in accordance with provisions of the Florida Evidence Code. 104 The
motion described the statements to the detective, to Dr. Gomez, and to the Chil-
dren's Center-and listed eighteen "indicia of reliability," including the following:
1. The mental, chronological and developmental age of the victim
making the statements.
2. The competency of the victim making the statements.
10o The motions mentioned in the following text can be found in the Garcia documents on file
at the University of Minnesota Law Library. See supra note 69.
101 This motion was based on the Florida "rape shield" law, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West
1999).
102 See Dailey v. State, 501 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). See also supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
103 Since Garcia in fact had a prior record, referring to it would have been useful for impeach-
ment if he were to take the stand, and impeaching the defendant would obviously have been to the
prosecutor's advantage. It appears that Sexual Battery Unit prosecutors file a basket of boiler plate
motions preceding trials as a matter of course.
104 The motion indicated that reliance for the statements' admissibility would be placed first
on "spontaneous statements or excited utterances" exceptions to the hearsay exclusion under FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 90.803(1), (2) (West 2004), as well as on FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West
2004), the general, catch-all reliability provision.
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3. The time the statements were made and the disclosure of the
criminal acts....
5. The repeated nature of the victim's statements....
7. The similarities in the victim's statements....
9. The victim's lack of motive to fabricate statements.
10. The victim's abilities to recount accurate details....
15. That the victim was rewarded not to disclose the acts of sexual
abuse....
18. Other indicia of reliability which may become known to the
State.
In July, 1996, following several trial continuances, Graham asked the court's
permission to withdraw as attorney of record: "differences have arisen between
counsel and the defendant and there is no longer confidence that exist between
them;" defendant "has not been able to meet his financial obligations and is not in
communication with counsel." The motion was denied. The 1997 post-conviction
relief motion, based on Graham's failure to provide Garcia effective assistance of
counsel, described the impasse:
15. Graham began to ask Garcia for more money [in addition to the
initial $5,000]. Garcia was unable to pay him any additional funds.
16. Garcia began having trouble communicating with Graham, who
frequently sent others to cover court hearings and to meet with Gar-
cia.
17. Graham informed Garcia that if he did not pay him the requested
additional fees, he would be unable to continue working on the case
and investigating possible defenses. In fact, Graham never contacted
any of the witnesses Garcia provided to him. Had Graham con-
tacted, investigated and prepared the defense witnesses for trial,
Garcia would have proceeded to trial with a viable defense and
would not have accepted the plea which required him to plead guilty
to offenses he did not commit.
18. Graham filed a motion to withdraw from the case on July 16,
1996, alleging that Garcia had failed to pay part of his fee and that
there was no communication between attorney and client.... This
Court did not permit Graham to withdraw.
19. Garcia was unable to pay any further fees and Graham advised
him that he would have to plead guilty or proceed to trial without
Graham being prepared. Graham's staff advised Garcia that he was
facing the likely possibility of thirty years in jail based on the state's
case and the lack of a viable defense. Upon Graham's advice, Gar-
cia attended an appointment with Dr. Melendez and informed Dr.
Melendez that he had been advised by his attorney that he would
have to admit his guilt to Dr. Melendez or the plea offer would fall
through.
20. On February 4, 1997, Garcia signed the plea agreement under
threat of proceeding to trial with an attorney who was unprepared,
who had failed to investigate the case, who had failed to prepare a
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defense and who was at odds with his client because of his fee. This
Court informed Garcia that there would be no further continuances
of his case.'
0 5
Dr. Melendez, a Ph.D. psychologist who testified frequently for defendants
and occasionally for the State in child sexual abuse prosecutions, enjoyed the re-
spect of prosecutors, defense counsel and judges. Dr. Melendez apparently failed
to file a report. The file did contain a letter, dated September 29, 1996, from Dr.
Ramirez, also a Ph.D. psychologist, addressed to the trial judge and reporting a one
hour interview of Garcia conducted pursuant to the judge's order. Both psycholo-
gists, individual entrepreneurs, provided mental health services to sexual offenders
as paid consultants to a treatment center which, in turn, contracted with county au-
thorities to offer such services. Sexual Battery Unit files suggest that Dr. Ramirez
was often chosen by prosecutors to furnish the judge an analysis of the defendant
as an adjunct to plea bargaining. °6 Dr. Ramirez's interview lasted about an hour.
The report provided a short personal history (including references to the occasion
of Garcia's first sexual experience, his divorces, the children he had fathered, and
his past and present employment), contained some boiler plate paragraphs featured
in each of Dr. Ramirez' s reports,107 found that "although at times he was coopera-
tive, at other times he was argumentative," and concluded that Garcia was not
amenable to treatment because "of his complete denial of having engaged in any
inappropriate sexual behavior. Because of his denial he would not benefit from
treatment."
On February 4, 1997, Garcia, his lawyer and the prosecutor signed a form
guilty plea agreement to a reduced charge: one count of attempted sexual battery
and two counts of lewd assault on a minor. The deal called for sex offender treat-
ment by Dr. Melendez, a "CTS" sentence ("credit for time served"-some forty-
two days between his arrest and the Arthur hearing), and ten years of supervision
as a special condition of probation. Handwritten on the State's copy of the agree-
ment were the words "plea colloquy ordered," "sex predator order signed,"
"V/family in agmt," and "original in court file." The plea agreement was initialed
by Garcia on each page. During the plea hearing, Graham assured the trial judge
that he had gone over the agreement with Garcia in his office, that a court inter-
05See supra note 69.
106 Under the aegis of the agency, Dr. Ramirez was the author of every mental health report
found in the several hundred Dade County files examined in this study. See supra note 4. Dr.
Melendez was apparently employed by defense lawyers more frequently than was Dr. Ramirez.
107 "His thinking appeared abstract and rational, relevant, and goal oriented with no sign of
any psychotic process. His feelings (affect) were variable and appropriate to the situation. His
speech, orientation, memory, sensorium (ability to take in and process sensations), and concentra-
tion all seemed to be within normal limits. Intelligence was estimated to be within average to above
average range. He denied and gave no evidence of any hallucinations, delusions, or homicidal or
suicidal ideation. His insights into himself, why a person would do what he is charged with, or why
it is wrong were minimal and concrete." This quote and all other information concerning Dr. Rami-
rez's report can be found in the documents on file with the University of Minnesota Law Library.
See supra note 69.
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preter had reviewed each word with him that morning; Graham acknowledged that
there was a factual basis for the plea. 0 8 The judge waived the cost of probation
supervision when Garcia explained that he took home $120 a week, but ordered
him to pay $150 to the Rape Treatment Center and the cost of Dr. Melendez's
treatment. The judge signed an order adjudicating the defendant a sexual preda-
tor.' 
09
The agreement, consisting of thirty-one paragraphs, was identical to all plea
documents found in the files of the Capital Sexual Battery Unit. The agreement, if
enforced, would significantly limit Garcia's freedom in a variety of ways for the
ten years of his probationary status, would pose substantial risk that his probation
would be revoked, and certainly would jeopardize any relationship Garcia might
otherwise be able to maintain with his daughter. The agreement's recitals included
the following:
2.... In addition to any special condition of probation which may
be imposed upon the Defendant as enumerated in the probation or-
der, as a special condition of probation, the Defendant will enter, ac-
tively participate in and successfully complete the Mentally Disor-
dered Sexual Offender Treatment Program of Melendez, Ph.D.' 1
3. The Defendant shall participate in this Mentally Disordered Sex-
ual Offender Treatment Program under the terms and conditions of
the Program including, but not limited to, compliance with the rules,
regulations and directives of the Program, regular reporting in per-
son to the Program Representative or clinician, participation in
counseling, and any other such requirements the staff shall impose,
delete, or modify from time to time and hereby waives any claim of
confidentiality regarding reports from the Program staff to partici-
pating community agencies or parties to this matter.
4. The Defendant waives any claim of privilege or confidentiality
regarding any and all statements made to Program Representatives,
Counselors, clinicians or participants in the Program or other indi-
viduals directly or indirectly associated with the program. Said
waiver of privilege extends to matters related to the charges which
formed the basis for the Defendant's admission into the program as
108 Without rehearsing the allegations in open court, the judge commented: "The arrest form,
information and conversations, discovery, et cetera, that we've all had certainly form a factual basis
for this plea." This quote and all information concerning Garcia's plea mentioned in the text can be
found in the documents on file with the University of Minnesota Law Library. See supra note 69.
"o9 Asked by the judge whether he had explained the sexual predator order, Graham said it was
in the agreement. The prosecutor disagreed and provided a separate order the judge then signed. In
his motion for post-conviction relief, Garcia argued that the sexual predator label, requiring publi-
cation of the defendant's name and photograph, was never explained to him by Graham and that
the agreement made no mention of the sexual predator label. The motion's other allegations are
described at supra note 105 and the accompanying text.
110 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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well as to any records, progress notes, impressions and reports
which may be generated as a result of the Defendant's participation
in the Program .... Any and all such statements, reports, records,
notes, etc., shall be admissible in any court of law, in any proceed-
ing, without objection from the Defendant.
5. The Defendant's term of 10 years of probation shall not be termi-
nated early and neither will the special terms of probation contained
herein be modified without the express consent of the Assistant
State Attorney, with consent of the victim and her family and the
approval of the Court....
7. The Defendant shall comply with the terms and conditions of the
Program until discharged, terminated, or successfully completed.
The decision to terminate or discharge shall be within the complete
discretion of the supervising clinical psychologist, clinician or
therapist. Said termination and discharge may be based upon the
Defendant's lack of active participation in the program, failure to at-
tend meetings, unsuitability or unamenability to treatment, violation
of terms and conditions of the program or agreement, or any other
basis deemed appropriate by the treating psychologist, clinician or
therapist.
8. If, in the opinion of the clinical psychologist or clinician supervis-
ing the particular case, the Defendant's participation is not meet-
ing with acceptable success, the Defendant may be terminated from
the program, and the Defendant may be brought before the Court for
a Probation Violation Hearing....
10. The Defendant is aware that an arrest and/or conviction for any
misdemeanor and/or felony during the pendency of this plea agree-
ment, may result in his immediate termination from the program....
14. The Defendant shall personally obtain permission from his Pro-
gram Counselor, clinician, therapist and the Court's approval before
temporarily leaving Dade County, Florida.
15. The Defendant shall not be out of the area and away from treat-
ment obligations without the expressed written consent of the Pro-
gram Counselor, clinician or therapist.
16. The Defendant shall pay for any treatment needs his victim may
have as a result of the sexual abuse, provided the cost is fair and
reasonable.
17. The Defendant shall have no alcohol or drug-related offenses,
including traffic-related criminal offenses.
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18. The Defendant shall not visit or have any contact in person,
written, verbal or via a third party with the victim of his sexual
abuse.
19. The Defendant shall not enter the victim's family property
and/or residence where the victim resides."'
20. The Defendant shall reside in a setting where there are no mi-
nors (under the age of 18), females or males. Any modification of
this condition must first be approved by the Court....
23. The Defendant shall not date, become involved with or live with
any woman (man) who has minor children or has custody of minor
children unless permission is granted by the Court after consultation
with the program counselor, clinician or therapist....
24. The Defendant shall have no unsupervised contact with minors.
25. The Defendant shall be gainfully employed full-time, actively
seeking full-time employment or shall be enrolled in and attending
classes.
26. The Defendant is prohibited from teaching in public and private
schools.... The Defendant is prohibited from entering into any pro-
fession or job which would require him to wear a uniform.
27. The Defendant shall agree to polygraph examinations at his ex-
pense where necessary for good cause shown after all parties confer.
30. The Defendant's probation officer shall prepare a written report
every 90 days outlining the Defendant's progress and performance
and file said report with the court with copies to the State Attorney
and defense counsel. 112
31. The program counselor, clinician or therapist shall prepare a
written report on a monthly basis outlining the Defendant's progress
and performance. The report will be filed with the court with copies
to the State Attorney, defense counsel and the Defendant's proba-
tion officer every 3 months. . ... '
The motion for post-conviction relief was filed in December, 1997. The
prosecutor's copy had hand-written comments in the margin of each paragraph,
1 Note that this paragraph and paragraphs 20 and 24 below, if enforced, would end any rela-
tionship Garcia may have had with his daughter.
112 No reports of any kind were found in the file when it was read during summer, 1997.
13 See supra note 69.
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"not admissible testimony." The motion was denied without opinion in August,
1998.
Was Garcia innocent? Or, if he had been willing to "roll the dice," would a
jury have acquitted him? Or was he lucky to escape with a month in jail when, had
he gone to trial, he would have been convicted by a jury disposed to "believe the
child" and sentenced to life without possibility of parole? Did Garcia's lawyer
"cop a plea" for a defendant he knew to be guilty, or did he simply take the easy
road because any additional legal work the judge's order required of him would
have been pro bono, and persuading the client to plead guilty was the least disad-
vantageous strategy? Is Garcia at risk as a patient in Dr. Melendez' s sex offender
treatment program because sooner or later, if he continues to deny guilt, Dr.
Melendez will have to report him to the judge as a probation violator?1 4 Was
Elena lying to help her mother get rid of Garcia? Or is it too unlikely that a ten-
year-old girl would make up such a story and stick by it through police, medical,
and social agency interviews, as well as a lawyer's adverse cross-examination in a
deposition? How credible would jurors find Elena if her descriptions of the assault
and the sensations she experienced failed to meet their common sense expectations
of the physical consequences of anal rape?
Don't expect definitive answers to these or a host of other questions about the
Garcia case. The "real" facts of cases never tried (and many that were tried) are
hard to come by.
A doctrinal issue requires attention-an issue that might not have been spot-
ted by the lawyers or the judge. Is testimony about sphincter tone relevant? Recall
that the capital sexual battery statute prohibits "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration
by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of
another by any other object," if the victim is a "person less than twelve years of
age."' 15 The crime's elements are satisfied if ajury can find that Garcia's penis was
in "union with" Elena's anus-and "union with" has been interpreted to mean
simple contact. 1 6 Penetration would not have to be proved and the Rape Treatment
Center report (with its decreased anal sphincter tone finding as evidence of pene-
tration) would not have to be introduced. The prosecutor, knowing that Dr. Gomez
would be impeachable, could rely solely on Elena's testimony at trial and her con-
114 Convicted sex offenders sentenced to probation on condition that they complete treatment
successfully have had their probations revoked if they continue to refuse to admit guilt. The Flor-
ida cases point in opposite directions. See Diaz v. State, 629 So. 2d 261, 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (defendant's probation cannot be revoked simply because he refused to admit guilt to coun-
selor with whom he was ordered to attend counseling sessions; plea agreement did not contain
clause specifically requiring admission); Archer v. State, 604 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (probation revocation affirmed because defendant refused to acknowledge sexual problem in
counseling sessions required by plea agreement; no mention of specific terms of agreement).
Whether Garcia's plea agreement, supra text preceding note 113, required admission of guilt with
sufficient specificity to authorize revocation under the right circumstances is not clear. According
to Garcia's motion for post-conviction relief, he confessed (allegedly incorrectly and under pres-
sure from his lawyer) to Dr. Melendez but denied guilt to Dr. Ramirez.
J15 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 794.011 (1)(h), (2) (West 2004).
116 See supra note 13.
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sistent statements to the detective and the Children's Center interviewer. Elena's
descriptions of penetration could be explained as terms a child might use to explain
contact; in any event, the jury would not have to go beyond the meaning the statute
gives to Elena's statements. In this scenario, defense counsel would have no basis
for impeaching Dr. Gomez-Elena's sphincter tone is simply irrelevant.
The situation is very different if, for whatever reason, the prosecutor were to
decide (as the prosecutor in the Garcia case apparently did) to prove penetration by
having Dr. Gomez's report explained by a less impeachable medical source. Then
the crucial evidentiary issue in the case has to be confronted. What is known (or-
perhaps more important in light of what occurs in trials-what can an effective
medical expert persuade a jury to believe) about decreased anal sphincter tone? A
responsible and objective pediatrician expert on sphincter tone would probably
give testimony along the following lines: decreased anal sphincter tone may tell an
examiner something about the likelihood that sodomy has occurred-but because
the physical observation is difficult and impressionistic there are dangers of a mis-
taken diagnosis. It is certainly possible that a ten-year-old who was anally raped by
an adult one month before the examination would show no sign of trauma from the
experience-both because children heal quickly and because the physical impact
of the rape on the child depends greatly on the amount of force used by the rapist
and how much penetration of the anus actually occurred. Since children can de-
scribe as penetration a very limited entry into the buttocks only, physical damage to
the anus--decreased sphincter tone or some other consequence-may simply not
occur. But sphincter tone testimony may be suspect. Anal colposcopy (utilizing a
device for magnifying, illuminating and photographing the ano-genital area), pic-
turing hills, ridges and lesions, was used by pediatricians in criminal trials to prove
sodomy when normative studies of children's anuses had not been undertaken;
when such studies were done, children who had not been abused turned out to ex-
hibit just the hills, ridges and lesions which had been relied on to confirm sod-
omy. 17 A notorious English scandal (which involved the conviction in one town of
a number of innocent parents) tarred the use of such testimony. 118 Many experts
would not be willing to testify "to a reasonable medical certainty" 19 that Elena was
117 See John. McCann et al., Genital Findings in Pre-Pubertal Girls Selected for Non-Abuse:
A Descriptive Study, 86 PEDIATRICS 428 (1990). See also Shireen Atabaki, M.D. & Jan E. Paradise,
M.D., The Medical Evaluation of the Sexually Abused Child: Lessons from a Decade of Research,
104 PEDIATRICS 178, 180 (July 1999): "In published series in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a
substantial proportion of sexually abused children, both boys and girls, were reported to have anat-
omic abnormalities of the external genitalia or perineum. Investigators suggested that findings such
as ... bumps, attenuation, and synechiae constituted physical evidence of the sexual abuse the
children had experienced.... Taken together, data from McCann and colleagues [and others]
demonstrate conclusively that small variations in the size, contour, and appearance of the external
genitalia in girls who have not been sexually abused occur relatively frequently.... Accordingly,
the presence of these anatomic variations should not be interpreted as evidence that sexually abu-
sive physical contact has occurred."
118 See BEATRix CAMPBELL, UNOFFICIAL SECRETS: CHILD SExuAL ABUSE: TIHE CLEVELAND
CASE (1988).
119 This phrase states the test most state courts have established to justify the admissibility in
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the victim of sodomy based upon the unsupported statement in Dr. Gomez's re-
port. 1
20
Would a jury convict Garcia with the medical testimony the prosecutor could
present? Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel would be able to make a very
accurate prediction of the outcome. But this is not the most likely litigation sce-
nario. If the prosecutor prepared carefully and Garcia could afford the best defense,
medical experts with fulsome curricula vitae would contradict each other as to the
reliability of Dr. Gomez's observation and as to the inferences that should be
drawn from it. Under such circumstances, the outcome would be unpredictable,
especially since there was no corroboration of Elena's claims of abuse. But Garcia
could not pay for the best defense. Even without the urging of his now free (but no
doubt unhappy) lawyer, even without independent evidence of criminal behavior,
Garcia could have seen the handwriting on the wall-"life in prison" was how it
would read.
IV. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
Generalizations do not come easily--especially generalizations about such
different criminal prosecutions, punishing different behaviors, with such different
outcomes. In Gibson, the defendant admitted the offense, went to trial, turned
evidence of a medical or other expert opinion.
120 Consider the reflections on the Garcia case provided by a pediatrician with substantial ex-
perience consulting and testifying in child sexual abuse cases: "The Rape Treatment Center doctor's
testimony, is problematic for several reasons. If he is being deposed as an expert medical examiner
in child sexual abuse, based perhaps on his clinical experience more than on any formal training, he
does not present his finding of decreased anal sphincter tone within any context of diagnostic cer-
tainty. He should explain exam findings that are normal or non-specific and what is suspicious or
generally thought to be clear signs of abuse. Sphincter tone is a physiologic state and not primarily
an altered anatomic one. There is some terminology that can be confusing. Determination of anal
sphincter tone (presumably by gloved digital exam) vs. observation only of anal dilatation or con-
traction either by eye or with a magnifying instrument (colposcope) is not the same thing. Most
medical examiners would not perform digital or instrument (anascopic) exams routinely unless there
is some clinical indication as bleeding or signs of acute blunt trauma as anal or rectal tears or possi-
ble internal injury. Maybe this is a regional preference or something that an OBGYN person would
do. McCann's studies of a non-abused, pre-pubertal population did not involve rectal exams (as far
as I know). He did show that anal dilatation was a common finding in almost all of the children
studied, becoming more apparent as the exam time increased and was more likely with the presence
of stool in the rectum. There is also the term 'anal laxity' which is used to describe conditions
thought to be associated with chronic stretching of the sphincter, possibly from abuse, but not very
common or well documented in the abuse literature. McCann also reported on anal findings in some
young children following a known acute anal penetration episode but did not find anal dilatation; he
commented that persistent anal dilatation is a finding more associated with chronic abuse. The Rape
Treatment Center doctor implied that chronic anal penetration either by abuse or sexual relations
causes permanent loss of anal sphincter tone. I don't think this is a well established finding in kids
since most exams even with a good history of abuse or penetration are normal. I think that most
pediatricians would be comfortable with the 'consistent with abuse' language in this case; anal lax-
ity might be in the suspicious category, but it would not in my opinion rise to the 'diagnostic of
abuse' level of certainty." Letter from Harvey S. Kaplan, M.D., dated September 11, 2000 (on file
with the author).
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down what appeared to be the prosecutor's post-conviction, face-saving offer of a
substantially diminished (but still harsh) penalty, and ended up contemplating the
rest of his life in prison. In Garcia, the defendant denied guilt, seemed to have a
fair chance to be acquitted, but avoided the risk of life in prison only by pleading
guilty to a lesser included offense. Yet Garcia did not escape punishment (in addi-
tion to the few days he spent in jail when first arrested): he had to suffer (at least
practical) termination of his relationship with his daughter and life-time public des-
ignation as a sexual predator; he was subsequently denied an opportunity to prove
his innocence even though his guilty plea may have been the product of his law-
yer' s desire to withdraw as well as the harshness of the penalty for his alleged be-
havior. Despite the differences, there may be lessons to be learned from the two
cases considered together.
First, the cases dramatically show how vital to defendants, especially to de-
fendants charged with an "LWOP" or some other harshly penalized crime, are the
services of a good defense lawyer. But consider how difficult it would be ade-
quately to protect Gibson's interest in good legal representation in post-conviction
proceedings-considering the "effectiveness" and "prejudice" factors judges take
into account (both doctrinal and covert but real considerations). Judges are handi-
capped in assessing how effective Gibson's (or any other defendant's) lawyer's
representation was after a guilty plea or a jury conviction. A post-conviction mo-
tion judge would know only from a stale transcript and, even then, mostly, if not
exclusively, from second-hand reports, the nature of Gibson's behavior with his
stepdaughter and how often it occurred; the judge could only surmise as to the im-
pact of the behavior on the victim; the judge would not know the nature of the
prosecutor's pre-trial guilty plea offer to Gibson; ' 21 the judge would not know in
what fashion Gibson's original or the substituted public defender "encouraged"
Gibson to accept a deal offered by the prosecutor, or if Gibson himself insisted on
going to trial despite advice that his confession would be admissible and his con-
viction highly probable; the post-conviction judge would not know what alterna-
tives there may have been to the admittedly risky trial strategy the substituted law-
yer chose, and what the chances were that those alternatives would have persuaded
a jury, that jury, to acquit; any lawyer called to testify in a proceeding whose pur-
pose is to prove his previous incompetence or malpractice would have some ten-
dency to defend his previous judgments and tactics-even perhaps to color them
slightly to his own advantage.'22 In short, the quality of legal representation is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to assess after the fact.
We know more about Garcia's lawyers' performances-and, at first glance, it
seems clear that it was a mistake to hire Graham. His first lawyer got him Arthur
bail, and undermined any utility Dr. Gomez might otherwise have had as a prose-
121 But see supra note 37, indicating that in Gibson's post-conviction relief proceeding, both
of Gibson's lawyers testified that they had encouraged him to accept the prosecutor's plea offer.
Moreover, experienced trial and appellate judges might well know what kinds of plea "discounts"
local prosecutors typically offer.
122 See supra notes 48, 50, and 62.
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cution witness if the case were to be tried. Graham persuaded (or by demanding
additional money effectively coerced) Garcia to plead guilty-with the result that
he will be labeled a sexual predator for life. Thus, good lawyers make a difference.
But wait a minute-Graham may have "succeeded" by being unprepared, perhaps,
or because the judge compelled him to continue representing Garcia, since the
prosecutor may have feared that, without much help from an unprepared and unen-
thusiastic Graham, Garcia's post-conviction "denial of effective assistance" claim
might be successful. 123 Graham negotiated a plea agreement that allowed Garcia to
"walk" with no additional jail time when going to trial might have gotten him life
in prison and a predator label as well. Does "good lawyering" make a difference-
when the punishment stakes are so high, the uncertainty of jury judgment so great,
and the prediction of outcome so difficult? Perhaps over a run of cases-but the
"proof is not evident, the presumption not great" 124 in either Gibson's or Garcia's
case.
The two cases, considered together, suggest that although prosecutions for se-
rious felonies may not, strictly speaking, "have a life of their own," their goals and
pace and to a substantial degree their outcomes are effectively controlled by prose-
cutorial authority and are not very much constrained by appellate review. Of
course, convictions are reversed-on almost any available basis if appellate judges
are dubious about the defendant's actual guilt, on the basis of a single error if the
prosecutor or the judge makes a sufficiently egregious mistake.1 25 Yet lawyers'
skills are variable, time for pre-trial preparation is almost never as fulsome as nec-
essary, hearings and trials are chaotic; despite universal, intense and continual sec-
ond-guessing of trial tactics and trial events by prosecutors, defense counsel and
defendants, almost nothing is predictable and it is usually impossible to determine
what specific event or testimony, if any, determined the jury's verdict. So do the
Gibson and Garcia prosecutions teach us that a criminal trial truly involves "roll-
ing the dice?" Few criminal trial lawyers, prosecutors or defense counsel would
agree with that judgment-they would insist that, unless the facts control, lawyers
are vital and more often than not outcome-determinative.
It is difficult to read these cases, to weigh seriously the wisdom of the tactical
judgments of the prosecutors and the several defense counsel who represented
Gibson and Garcia, without invoking or feeling the omnipotent influence of the
"capital" penalty the legislature chose for the crime of child sexual abuse. Neither
the opinions in Gibson nor the prosecutor's file in Garcia prove it, but it seems to
me that most decisions by both prosecutors and defense counsel were influenced, if
not determined, by the "LWOP" "gorillas on their [more appropriately, their cli-
ents'] backs." Gibson's failure to accept a pre-trial offer was certainly in part a
product of the prosecutor's insistence that Gibson spend fifteen years in prison; it
123 Similarly, Gibson's lawyers' claim that they were unprepared for trial (a claim they later
denied, see supra note 48), combined with the jury's "intervention," may have succeeded in getting
Gibson an "unusual" offer of a plea to a lesser included offense. But see supra note 62 (Florida
lawyers claim that no defendant should be advised to rely on a post-conviction relief motion).
124 This is the test for Arthur case bail. See supra note 72.
125 See, e.g., the cases cited in supra notes 52-54.
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could also have been a product of Gibson's belief in his innocence and that he
would be acquitted despite a confession offered because he wanted his family re-
united.1 26 But why should the prosecutor "deal" with (or offer a "reasonable" sen-
tence to) a defendant who has confessed, when the down-side risks of going to trial
seem minimal? And if the prosecutor, emboldened by the punishment's severity,
holds out for a lengthy sentence in return for a plea (vide the Gibson prosecutor's
offer of twenty-five years after he was embarrassed by the jury's revolt), what in-
centive is there for the defendant or his lawyer to plead guilty? Garcia may have
been innocent (although no study of the file or interviews of the family is likely to
provide a definitive answer), but many lawyers would advise him not to "roll the
dice" when the risk of a guilty verdict carries such a huge price. Indeed, that the
prosecutor agreed to a plea bargain with credit for only forty-two days of time
served, although the prosecutor had vehemently opposed bail when the case was in
its initial stages, leads one at least to wonder about the prosecutor's evaluation of
the strength of his case; and if the case was not strong (probably because the prose-
cutor either wanted to protect the victim from the trauma of a trial or because the
prosecutor thought that the jury would not find the victim a credible witness), the
power of the statutory punishment to elicit a plea (turning the alleged perpetrator
into a life-long pariah) is obvious.
A warning was issued at the beginning of this essay that the Gibson and Gar-
cia cases might not be representative. Indeed, in-depth examination and evaluation
of individual cases, unlike common law review analyses of bodies of legal doc-
trine, is both atypical and potentially misleading-precisely because its focus is so
narrow. But as Gibson and Garcia clearly show, it is also misleading to evaluate
the criminal justice doctrine divorced from the many excruciatingly difficult and
often painful pretrial and trial tactical decisions defendants and their counsel (good
or bad) are compelled to make, decisions which will often determine how doctrines
apply to real people in the real world.
Studying these cases does lead to at least one incontestable proposition: no
matter how much one knows about a criminal prosecution, at the core, it remains a
mystery. The Gibson jury believed it had been uninformed and that full informa-
tion, in this case, about the penalty for the conviction, would have changed the
jury's determination of guilt. (Similarly, many juries are deprived of facts which
might lead, or lead more easily, to conviction-because, for example, of evidence
admissibility rules.) But the Gibson jury also knew nothing, or very little, about the
events which led to Gibson's prosecution; the jury would have known only the
facts to which an eight-year-old testified directly, or hearsay reports about the
events to which the child's mother, her grandmother, some police investigator, or a
therapist who had interviewed the child, would have testified. The jury would have
known no more about Gibson's persona, his explanation of the circumstances sur-
rounding the crime, his "remorse," the chances that he might (if not incarcerated)
repair the damage caused by his behavior and be "rehabilitated," or the psycho-
logical damage, if any, Gibson's behavior caused the victim. In Garcia's case, no
126 See supra note 22.
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jury examined the factual dispute between the defendant and his wife, no fact
finder considered the impact of his conviction on his daughter or the impact on
Garcia himself of his life-long predator status. The unknowns are innumerable. To
be sure, the fact that these cases remain in some sense mysteries hardly distin-
guishes them from most other criminal prosecutions, whether they terminate in a
guilty plea or a conviction by judge orjury. Yet how little can be known, about the
crime and the criminal, makes the case for any mandatory minimum sentence-
much less a life sentence without the possibility of parole-even more dubious.

